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ABSTRACT
Jiang, Xuan PhD, Purdue University, August 2018. Essays on Labor Economics.
Major Professors: Kevin Mumford and Miguel Sarzosa.
This dissertation is composed of three independent chapters in the ﬁeld of labor
economics, focusing on educational decisions, gender diﬀerences and gender diﬀerences in educational decisions.
The ﬁrst chapter investigates gender diﬀerences in college major choice and job
choice. Women are underrepresented in both STEM college degrees and STEM jobs.
Even with a STEM college degree, women are signiﬁcantly less likely to work in a
STEM occupation than their male counterparts. This paper investigates whether
men and women possess diﬀerent ability distributions and examines how much the
gender gap in major choice and job choice can be explained by gender diﬀerences
in sorting on abilities. I use Purdue University’s administrative data that contains
every Purdue student’s academic records linked to their ﬁrst job information. I apply
an extended Roy model of unobserved heterogeneity allowing for endogenous choice
with two sequential optimizing decisions: the choice between a STEM and non-STEM
major and the choice between a STEM and non-STEM job. I ﬁnd that both abilities are signiﬁcantly weaker determinants of major choice for women than for men.
High-ability women give up $13,000–$20,000 in annual salary by choosing non-STEM
majors. Those non-STEM high-ability women only make up 5.6% of the female sample, but their total gains—had they made the same decision as men—explain about
9.4% of the gender wage gap. Furthermore, the fact that female STEM graduates are
less likely to stay in STEM is unrelated to the diﬀerences in ability sorting. Instead,
home region may be important in women’s job decisions; female STEM graduates

xiii
who return to their home state are more likely to opt out of STEM.

The second chapter exploits China’s One-Child Policy to study the relationship between fertility expectation and educational attainment of the mothers of the “siblingless generation”. One-Child Policy was China’s most intensive family planning policy
which implemented by the end of 1979 and only restricted Han families to have one
child. I use two diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approaches—one compares gender diﬀerence among Han, the other compares ethnicity diﬀerences between Han women and
non-Han women—to estimate how Han women changed their educational choice in
response to the policy. The OCP explains 53.6% of the 2.38 year average increase in
education for women born between 1960–1980. Potential mechanisms include delaying entry to the ﬁrst marriage, motherhood and increasing labor force participation.
This study highlights the policy’s positive externality on women’s education.

The third chapter studies how China’s Open Door Policy’s implementation at the
end of 1978 aﬀected the skill composition for workers born 1960-1970. Using measures
of local labor markets’ export exposure, we ﬁnd that export growth increased high
school completion rates but had no eﬀect on middle school completion rates. For
every $1000 increase in exports per worker, high school completion rates decreased
by 4.76 p.p. for workers born in 1970 compared to those born in 1960, explaining
about 10.4% of the national decline in high school completion for 1960s birth cohorts.
This suggests a tradeoﬀ between education and labor market opportunities in China.
China’s growth was likely dampened during the early industrialization of the 1980s
and 1990s, as the Open Door Policy simultaneously reduced the availability of skilled
labor.

1

1. PLANTING THE SEEDS FOR SUCCESS: WHY
WOMEN IN STEM DON’T STICK IN THE FIELD
1.1

Introduction
Women are underrepresented in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathemat-

ics (STEM) college majors and occupations. While nearly as many women hold
college degrees as men overall, they make up only about 30 percent of all STEM
degree holders. Women ﬁll 47 percent of all U.S. jobs but hold only 24 percent of
STEM jobs. Moreover, women with STEM college degrees are less likely than their
male counterparts to work in a STEM occupation. About 40 percent of men with
STEM college degrees work in STEM jobs, while only 23 percent of women with
STEM degrees work in STEM jobs. (Noonan, 2017).
Why is the lack of women in the STEM ﬁeld a concern? First, we face a scarcity
of STEM workers in many industries, even though STEM jobs are among the bestpaying jobs (Xue & Larson, 2015). Attracting and retaining more women in STEM
will help with unﬁlled positions. Second, when women are not seen as equal to men
in STEM, girls don’t have role models to motivate them and help them envision
themselves in those positions. They are deterred by the idea that STEM is a “man’s
ﬁeld” where girls don’t belong (Shapiro & Williams, 2012). Last, when women are
not involved in STEM, products, services and solutions are mostly designed by men
and according to their user experiences. The needs and desires that are unique to
women may be overlooked (Fisher & Margolis, 2002; Clayton et al., 2014).
The ﬁrst research question of this paper is how much of the gender gap in college major choice and job choice can be explained by gender diﬀerences in sorting
on abilities. There is abundant literature that covers the issue of ability sorting in
college major choices (Arcidiacono, 2004; Arcidiacono et al., 2012; Wiswall & Zafar,
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2015a; Humphries et al., 2017) and that of gender diﬀerences in college major choices
(Polachek, 1978, 1981; Daymont & Andrisani, 1984; Blakemore & Low, 1984; Turner
& Bowen, 1999; Dickson, 2010; Ahn et al., 2015; Eccles, 2007; Trusty, 2002; Ethington
& Woﬄe, 1988; Hanson et al., 1996). Yet the two elements—ability sorting in college
major choices and gender diﬀerences—have rarely been linked. My second question
is, by not choosing a STEM major or a STEM job, do women leave any money on
the table; and how much? Third, why are female STEM degree holders more likely
to leave STEM than their male counterparts?
I apply an extended Roy model of unobserved heterogeneity to explore the endogenous choices of major and job and, more importantly, the gender diﬀerences in
these choices. The model involves two sequential optimizing decisions separately estimated for men and women: one chooses between graduating with a STEM degree
and a non-STEM degree; after getting a STEM degree, one chooses between a STEM
occupation and a non-STEM occupation. My model relies on the identiﬁcation of two
latent abilities, general intelligence and extra mathmatical ability, to deal with sequential selections of major and job. Most of the literature (Arcidiacono, 2004; Long
et al., 2015; Altonji et al., 2016) use standardized test scores, such as SAT scores, as
measures of ability. Those test scores, however, should only be considered as proxies
or functions of true abilities (Carneiro et al., 2003; Heckman et al., 2006; Sarzosa &
Urzúa, 2015; Prada et al., 2017). Moreover, the identiﬁcation strategy here assumes a
mixture of normals for the distributions of both latent abilities, which avoids the restriction for them being normal and guarantees the ﬂexibility of the functional forms
the latent abilities could take.
The data—Purdue University’s administrative (Registrar) data—I am using fulﬁll
the requirement of the identiﬁcation of the two latent abilities. They contain the
academic records of Purdue undergraduate students who graduated between 2005–
2014 and is linked to their ﬁrst destination survey conducted by the Purdue Center
for Career Opportunities. The data provide rich information on individuals’ high
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school GPA, standardized test scores (ACT English, ACT Reading, ACT Math and
ACT Science) and entire college transcripts data.
I ﬁnd the distributions of abilities at the start of college are diﬀerent across gender;
however, gender diﬀerences in abilities cannot explain the huge gender gap in major
and job choices. Abilities are signiﬁcantly weaker determinants of major choice for
women than for men. In fact, high-ability men are more likely to choose STEM
majors relative to high-ability women. Speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation increase
in an average woman’s general intelligence will increase her likelihood of graduating
with a STEM degree by 17.2 percentage points while that number is 23.4 for an
average man. A one standard deviation increase in the extra mathematical ability of
an average woman will increase her probability of graduating from a STEM major by
9.5 percentage points; the same change will increase an average man’s likelihood of
graduating with a STEM degree by 14 percentage points. This is consistent with the
recent ﬁndings in Ahn et al. (2015), which suggests that women are less sensitive to
or more critical about their abilities. Alternatively, other characteristics unobserved
by the researcher could be more dominant to women’s college major decision. For
my second research question, I ﬁnd that high-ability women leave large amounts of
money on the table by choosing non-STEM majors. A counterfactual analysis shows
that a high-ability woman gives up $13,000–$20,000 in annual salary by choosing
non-STEM majors. These non-STEM high-ability women only make up 5.6% of the
female sample, but their earning losses explain about 9.4% of the gender wage gap1 .
The existing literature on this topic has focused on students’ college major choices
and the policy implications of attracting students to STEM majors. However, the
career outcomes of STEM graduates remains unexplored. My model is able to assess
the determinants of job choice by allowing the STEM graduates to make the choice
between STEM and non-STEM jobs conditional on their major choice. Among both
male and female STEM graduates, I ﬁnd little evidence of sorting on abilities when
making a job decision. Thus, the fact that female STEM graduates are less likely to
1

The gender wage gap—$8198—is calculated by subtracting the averaged Purdue’s female graduates
annual salary by the averaged Purdue’s male graduates annual salary.
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stay in STEM compared to their male counterparts is not due to diﬀerences in ability
sorting. This implies that other factors are more important to STEM graduates when
making a job decision. Based on full decomposition of the job decision equation, I
ﬁnd that the (Census) region where a student came from2 may be a major factor in a
female STEM graduate’s decision to pursue a STEM or non-STEM job. Those who
go back to their home state after graduation are more likely to opt out of STEM
ﬁelds. Although this ﬁnding is not conclusive, it paves the way for future research
on female STEM graduates’ trade-oﬀ between opting out of STEM and returning to
their home state.
This study makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First, to
the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to estimate the gender diﬀerences
of ability sorting in job choices. Second, I am the ﬁrst to document that there is a
disproportionate and considerable number of high-ability women choose non-STEM
majors, an able to quantify the total gains if they had made the same choices as
high-ability men. I then use these total gains to explain the gender wage gap. Third,
I provide empirical evidence to answer the question of why female STEM graduates
are more likely to opt-out.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related literature on this
subject. Section 1.3 describes the data I used for the analysis. I then present the
model and the measurement system for the unobserved abilities in Section 1.4. In
Section 1.5 and Section 1.6, I show my results and counterfactual analysis. Section 1.7
discusses the policy implications. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes.

1.2

Related Literature
This paper addresses three branches of literature: college major choice, gender

diﬀerence in college major choice, and gender diﬀerence in job choice.
2

This is based on the place the student went for high school.
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1.2.1

College Major Choice

There is an extensive economic literature on college major choice. The college major premium and income diﬀerences between ﬁelds of study has been well documented.
Diﬀerences in return to majors are as large as diﬀerences in return to diﬀerent levels of
education, and even larger than diﬀerences in return to college quality (Arcidiacono,
2004; Altonji et al., 2015; Daymont & Andrisani, 1984; James et al., 1989). Most
studies ﬁnd that college students’ major decisions are related to expected earnings
or their beliefs about future earnings (Altonji et al., 2016; Beﬀy et al., 2012; Long et
al., 2015; Wiswall & Zafar, 2015b). Some studies focus on explaining major choices
by abilities sorting. Arcidiacono (2004) ﬁnds that major selection depends on the
monetary returns to various abilities, preferences in the workplace, and preferences
for studying particular majors in college. He argues that major and workplace preferences are more dominant to major selection, which is consistent with my ﬁndings
in this paper. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) and Wiswall & Zafar (2015a) show that sorting occurs both on expected earnings and on students’ perceptions of their relative
abilities to perform in particular majors. Based on a similar framework as my paper,
Humphries et al. (2017) decompose the college major premium into labor market
returns from multi-dimensional abilities and ﬁnds that sorting on abilities primarily
explains a college major’s enrollment rate and about 50% of students graduating from
a college major. However, they do not address gender diﬀerences in major choices
and only focus on a male sample.
Major switching behavior has been well documented too. Some studies suggest
that students who perform worse than they expected are more likely to dropout or
switch to a less diﬃcult major (Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2013; Arcidiacono,
2004). It is more likely for those with lower ability within a major to switch majors
because they are closer to the margin of choosing one major over another (Arcidiacono
et al., 2012).
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1.2.2

Gender Diﬀerences in Major Choices

Gender diﬀerences within college majors and in the workplace have attracted
extensive attention. On one hand, women’s college major choices appear to contribute
to the persistent gender wage gap. On the other hand, it has been a concern of
policymakers that women are underrepresented in STEM majors due to the reasons I
mention in the introduction. A common view in the literature is that women are less
likely to major in STEM and more likely to switch out of STEM majors, even after
controlling for abilities (Dickson, 2010; Turner & Bowen, 1999; Ahn et al., 2015).
The gender gap in labor market positions, including the gender wage gap and the
gender gap in certain types of jobs, is less attributed to discriminatory hiring practices,
but rather more to gender-speciﬁc preferences in college majors (Polachek, 1978; Daymont & Andrisani, 1984). This viewpoint has been widely accepted by economists,
yet some studies ﬁnd that educational environments associated with discrimination
or stereotyping have played an important role in gender segregation: women who
attend coeducational colleges are more likely to remain in female-dominated ﬁelds
than those who attended women’s colleges (Solnick, 1995).
More eﬀort has been made to explore gender-speciﬁc preferences in the workplace and gender diﬀerences in abilities or STEM readiness. For the former, studies
have found that gender diﬀerences in fertility expectations aﬀect gender diﬀerences
in college major choices. Young female students with higher expected fertility tend
to choose majors that are progressively less subject to atrophy and obsolescence (i.e.
history and English), considering the expected time-out-of-the-labor force (Polachek,
1981; Blakemore & Low, 1984). Men care more about pecuniary outcomes and leadership in the workplace, while women are more likely to value opportunities to help
others, to contribute to society, and to interact with people (Zafar, 2013; Daymont &
Andrisani, 1984). Regarding the latter, psychological and educational literature ﬁnds
that academic preparation in math and science are crucial determinants in choosing
a quantitative college major; however, there is a gender diﬀerences in the eﬀect of
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academic preparation in math and science on college major choices and persistency
in chosen majors (Eccles, 2007; Trusty, 2002; Ethington & Woﬄe, 1988). Hanson et
al. (1996) argue that women avoid the sciences and mathematics because of inferior
prior preparation, lack of innate ability, and biases against women in male-dominated
subjects. Others, however, argue that the small gender diﬀerences in math course
preparation does not explain the large gender diﬀerences in engineering majors (Xie
et al., 2003; Kimmel et al., 2012). Besides that, a growing body of literature suggests
that there are fewer women in STEM because they are less conﬁdent or more critical
of their abilities and more sensitive to negative feedback than men (Roberts, 1991;
Johnson & Helgeson, 2002).

1.2.3

Gender Diﬀerences in Job Choices

Compared to the rich literature on college major choices and the gender gap in
major choices, a smaller fraction has been devoted to exploring gender diﬀerences in
job choice. Similar to studies about gender diﬀerences in major choice, some argue
that gender diﬀerences in occupational choice are dependent on diﬀerences in the
distribution of scarce quantitative abilities (Paglin & Rufolo, 1990). Yet minimal
research has been done on the career path of STEM college graduates, especially the
gender diﬀerences in job selection among STEM college graduates. Young women’s
participation decreases with each stage in the science pipeline with greater gender
stratiﬁcation in science occupations than in science education, which suggests factors other than training generate inequality in high-status science occupations. The
demands of family and children are major nonacademic barriers for women on the
pathway to a STEM profession Hanson et al. (1996); Kimmel et al. (2012). Compared to previous studies, my paper investigates students’ entire career paths from
endogenous major choice to endogenous job choice.
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1.3

Data
I use a rich administrative data from Purdue Oﬃce of the Registrar that tracks the

academic records of every Purdue University undergraduate student. The academic
records are linked to the First Destination Survey conducted by the Purdue Center for
Career Opportunities. The sample includes undergraduate students who graduated
between 2005–2014. The data provides individual pre-college information including
demographic characteristics, date of enrollment, high school GPA, ACT and SAT
subject scores, and applied major.
Table 1.1 shows some statistics regarding the sample selection. I start with 18904
Purdue graduates; among which, 10516 have complete information on test scores required by my measurement system. International students only make up 2.3% of this
sample. I exclude all of them due to two reasons. First, international students have
very distinct educational background compared to the domestic students. Second, I
only observe ﬁrst job destination within U.S., yet most of international students left
U.S. after graduation. The ﬁrst destination survey is voluntary. I end up with 4192
graduates responded to the survey and reported a meaningful ﬁrst job title. Among
them, only 3055 reported a valid ﬁrst job annual salary3 .
In total, there are 1145 women and 1910 men in this reduced sample, of which
there are 37.03% of women graduated with a degree in a STEM major while there
are 63.40% of men graduated in STEM. Among those who graduated with a STEM
degree, 73.11% of women work in a STEM occupation and 81.17% of men work in a
STEM occupation. As one of the top engineering schools, it is not surprising that the
fractions of both Purdue female STEM graduates and Purdue male STEM graduates
are much higher than the fractions in the national-representative survey. Moreover,
3

With concerns of selection in reporting ﬁrst job, I estimate the model with dummy of reporting ﬁrst
job as dependent variable, two latent abilities and other characteristics as independent variables.
Table B.1 shows that women who reported to the survey do not diﬀer on abilities from women who
did. Although we see a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on men’s extra math ability, the magnitude
is too small to have signiﬁcant economic meaning: one standard deviation increase in extra math
ability will increase the probability for an average man to report his ﬁrst job information by 1.5
percentage points.
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the gender gap of staying in STEM ﬁeld after graduating from a STEM major is
much smaller in Purdue data—73.11% and 81.17%—than in the national data (26%
and 40%).
Table 1.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the 6 test scores—ACT English, ACT
Reading, ACT Math and ACT Science, high school GPA, and grade of COM1144 —
used to identify the two latent abilities in this paper. Overall, women and men have
similar test scores, with women having slightly higher ACT English score, COM114
grades and high school GPA while men having slightly higher ACT Reading, ACT
Science and ACT Math scores5 . Average self-reported annual salary of female is lower
than that of male. The Purdue gender wage gap is $8198.

1.3.1

STEM Major Deﬁnition

I use the ﬁrst graduation major as student’s major6 , regardless of what major
one applied or what major one started with. I observe graduation major for every
observation. Whoever dropped-out is not included in the sample. All Purdue majors
are coded into 6-digit Classiﬁcation of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes.
The STEM major dummy in this study is deﬁned by the “STEM Designated
Degree Program List Eﬀective May 10, 2016” published by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE, 2016). It is a complete list of ﬁelds of study that are
considered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be STEM ﬁelds of
study for purposes of the 24-month STEM optional practical training (OPT) exten4

Communication 114, Fundamentals of Speech Communication, is a required course for all freshmen
at Purdue. It is the study of communication theories as applied to speech, and involves practical
communicative experiences ranging from interpersonal communication and small group processes
to informative and persuasive speaking in standard speaker-audience situations. https://www.cla
.purdue.edu/communication/undergraduate/com 114.html
5
In the whole sample, there are 41% of students have taken ACT when they applied to Purdue
(including those who took both). The rest of them took only SAT. There is no selection on abilities
of taking ACT over SAT; especially, there is no gender diﬀerence in selection on abilities of taking
ACT over SAT. I will get into more details of the reason of using ACT scores in Section 1.4.1.
6
There are 2.76% students graduated with a double major, and 0.087% students graduated with
a third major. The second and third major are not considered in this paper. Engineering majors
cannot be listed a second major unless the ﬁrst major is engineering as well. A student can not
transfer into an engineering major if he’s not originally an engineering student.
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sion described at 8 CFR 214.2(f)7 . I categorize all Purdue undergraduate programs
showing up on this list as STEM major and the others as non-STEM major with
some exceptions8 .

1.3.2

STEM Occupation Deﬁnition

The ﬁrst destination survey provides self-reported ﬁrst job title, employer (company name), job location (city and state), and annual salary9 .
I match the self-reported job titles to a 6-digit level Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation (SOC) title with a corresponding SOC code by using O*NET search. I deﬁne
a self-reported job as STEM/non-STEM occupation according to the “Detailed 2010
SOC occupations included in STEM”10 published by Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS,
2012).

1.4

Model
This general framework is inspired by the Roy model (Roy, 1951), in which in-

dividuals make choices to maximize their expected labor outcomes based on their
comparative advantages. The core of the empirical strategy follows Carneiro et al.
(2003), Heckman et al. (2006), Sarzosa & Urzúa (2015) and Prada et al. (2017). The
model captures how college students sort into two groups of majors (STEM majors
7

Under 8 CFR 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(2), a STEM ﬁeld of study is a ﬁeld of study “included in the
Department of Education’s Classiﬁcation of Instructional Programs taxonomy within the two-digit
series containing engineering, biological sciences, mathematics, and physical sciences, or a related
ﬁeld.
8
There are some customization have been made according to Purdue’s particular programs. “Nursing” is deﬁned as non-STEM degree program by DHS, probably because there are many types of
nursing degrees and most of them do not focus on medical training. Nursing major in Purdue only
oﬀers Bachelor of Science in Nursing degree and the placement of undergraduates is basically registered nurse (RN). Additionally, registered nurse is deﬁned as a STEM occupation according to
BLS. There are two Purdue majors that are not documented in the DHS’s list, “Radiological Health
Sciences” and “Health Sciences General”. I treat both as STEM major based on the degrees both
programs oﬀer and the program requirements.
9
There are only 35% observations reported full information of ﬁrst job out of the whole registration
record; among which, only 68.76% reported a valid salary (non-missing and non-zero).
10
There are 840 6-digit SOC occupations and 184 of them are categorized as STEM occupations.
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and non-STEM majors) and given this, sort into two groups of occupations (STEM
occupations and non-STEM occupations). Particularly, at the start of college, students choose between a STEM major and a non-STEM major; after getting a STEM
degree, students choose between a STEM occupation and a non-STEM occupation.
Students maximize their expected outcome by making these sequential choices, based
on their latent abilities and observable characteristics.
The extended Roy model I implement here can be described as a set of outcome
equations linked by a factor structure with two underlying factors11 : θA , the general
intelligence and, θB , the extra mathematical ability. For each individual, the main
outcome variable, annual salary, is given by the following form:

Y = XY β Y + αY,A θA + αY,B θB + eY

(1.1)

where Y is the outcome variable, XY is a vector of all observable controls aﬀecting
outcome, β Y is the vector of returns associated with XY , αY,A and αY,B are the factor
loadings of each underlying factor θA and θB , and eY is the error term. I assume
that eY is independent from the observable controls and the unobserved factors, i.e.
⊥ (θA , θB , XY ). I further assume the factors θA and θB follow the distributions
eY ⊥
fθA (.) and fθB (.), which both are mixture of two normal distributions.
Choice of Major. The second model featuring the major choice is a speciﬁc case
of the model above. For simplicity, I classify college major choices dichotomously as
STEM majors and non-STEM majors, so as the occupation choices. Let IM denotes
the net beneﬁt associated with graduating with a STEM degree (relative to a nonSTEM degree).

IM = XM β M + αM,A θA + αM,B θB + eM

(1.2)

where XM is vector of all observable controls aﬀecting major choice, β M is the
vector of coeﬃcients associated with XM , αM,A and αM,B are the factor loadings. I
11

I use “factors” and “latent abilities” interchangeably in the paper.
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assume independency of the error term, i.e. eM ⊥
⊥ (θA , θB , XM ). DM (= 1 if IM > 0)
is a binary variable that equals one if the individual chooses a STEM major and zero
otherwise. Thus the major choice model can be re-written as
DM = 1[XM β M + αM,A θA + αM,B θB + eM > 0]

(1.3)

Choice of Job. After graduating from college, students face the choice between
STEM and non-STEM jobs. It is important to note that the major to job ﬂow is not
a two by two matrix (STEM major to STEM job, STEM major to non-STEM job,
non-STEM major to non-STEM job, non-STEM major to STEM job). According
to the Purdue data, there are only around 3% of observations falls into the fourth
category. I exclude this category due to two reasons. First, a STEM job requires
certain techniques that are usually obtained from the training of a STEM program
and can hardly be handled by one graduated with a degree in a non-STEM major,
in general. Second, due to small sample size, it is computationally impossible to
calculate the model with the fourth category included. Therefore, only graduates
with a STEM degree will make a choice between STEM and non-STEM job. NonSTEM graduates are considered to work in non-STEM jobs. The job choice model is
straightforward:
DJ = 1[XJ β J + αJ,A θA + αJ,B θB + eJ > 0] if DM = 1

(1.4)

where XJ is vector of all observable controls aﬀecting job choice, β J , αJ,A and
αJ,B are deﬁned in the same way as in the major choice model. Again, I assume
⊥ (θA , θB , XJ ). DJ is a binary variable that
independency of the error term, i.e. eJ ⊥
equals one if the individual chooses a STEM job and zero otherwise, conditional on
graduating with a STEM degree (DM = 1).
Now, we can re-deﬁne the salary equation (1) in terms of salary from diﬀerent
combinations of major choices and job choices. Let Y11 denote the salary when DM =
1 and DJ = 1 (i.e. choosing STEM major and STEM job), and Y10 denotes the
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outcome for those DM = 0 and DJ = 1 (i.e. choosing STEM major and non-STEM
job), and so on. Then we can combine the salary equations and the choices equations
to construct a system of outcomes, [Y11 , Y10 , Y00 , DM , DJ ]’:
Y11 = XY β Y11 + αY11 ,A θA + αY11 ,B θB + eY11 , if DM = 1, DJ = 1

(1.5)

Y10 = XY β Y10 + αY10 ,A θA + αY10 ,B θB + eY10 , if DM = 1, DJ = 0

(1.6)

Y00 = XY β Y00 + αY00 ,A θA + αY00 ,B θB + eY00 , if DM = 0

(1.7)

DM = 1[XM β M + αM,A θA + αM,B θB + eM > 0]

(1.8)

DJ = 1[XJ β J + αJ,A θA + αJ,B θB + eJ > 0] if DM = 1

(1.9)

where the error terms eY11 , eY10 , eY00 , eM and eJ are assumed jointly independent once
the unobserved heterogeneity (θA and θB ) are controlled.
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I use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to estimate the model12 by integrating the likelihood function below over the distributions of the two factors. The
likelihood function is
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(1.10)

where M denotes (XM i β M + αM,A θA + αM,B θB ) and J denotes (XJi β J + αJ,A θA +
αJ,B θB ).

1.4.1

The Measurement System of The Two Latent Abilities

To implement the two-factor model described above, I need to ﬁrst estimate the
distributions of the factors, F (θA ) and F (θB ), by a measurement system speciﬁed
based on the nature of the data. The measurement system takes the following form:
T = XT β T + αT,A θA + αT,B θB + eT

(1.11)

where T is a L × 1 vector that contains L test scores associated to latent abilities,
θA and θB . XT is a matrix with observable controls associated with test scores. αT,A
and αT,B are the loadings of the latent abilities. I assume independency of the error
terms, eT ⊥
⊥ (θA , θB , XT ). All elements in eT are mutually independent.
12

I use a modiﬁed version of the relative developed STATA command, heterofactor, by Sarzosa &
Urzúa (2016)
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Following the identiﬁcation strategy of Carneiro et al. (2003), the distribution of
two latent abilities, F (θA ) and F (θB ), the set of loadings of both abilities in each test
score equations, ΛT , are identiﬁed from variances and covariances of the residuals
from equation system (1.11). They show that three restrictions have to be fulﬁlled
to identify the factors:
1. Orthogonality of the factors (i.e.);
2. L ≥ 2k + 1, where L is the number of scores and k is the number of factors;
3. The factor structure within the measurement system needs to follow a triangular
pattern, indicating that the ﬁrst three scores are aﬀected by the ﬁrst factor only, while
the second three scores are aﬀected by both factors.
In order to identify k = 2 factors, I will need L ≥ 5 test scores here. The test
scores representing abilities at the beginning of college are listed in (1.12). The ﬁrst
set of test scores are ACTEnglish , COM 114, and ACTReading ; and the second set of test
scores are ACTScience , HSGP A, and ACTM ath . The intention of using ACT scores is
to gather enough number of test scores (Otherwise, using SAT scores—SAT verbal
and SAT math—would not fulﬁll the second restriction.) to identify two factors. The
purpose of identifying two factors is to capture two latent abilities—one representing
general abilities and the other representing math related abilities—and their varying
eﬀects on the choices.
⎡
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(1.12)

The structure of the loadings, ΛT , takes the following pattern in (1.13), where the ﬁrst
factor is allowed to aﬀect all 6 scores while the second factor is only allowed to aﬀect
scores of ACTScience , HSGP A, and ACTM ath . For example, if one increases her ﬁrst
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latent ability, all her 6 scores will increase; if one increase her second latent ability, her
ACTScience , HSGP A, and ACTM ath wil increase. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst factor
is identiﬁed from the covariances of all 6 scores; and the second factor is identiﬁed
form the “left-over” covariances of the second set of scores—ACTScience , HSGP A,
and ACTM ath —after the ﬁrst factor is identiﬁed. In this sense, I call the ﬁrst latent
ability as general intelligence, and the second as extra mathematical ability. I assume
individuals need “general intelligence” to study and comprehend every subjects.
This is the triangular pattern of the loading system mentioned above. Note that
αT3 ,A (i.e. the loading of ACTReading ) and αT6 ,B (i.e. the loading of ACTM ath ) are
normalized to 1 to facilitate the identiﬁcation.
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(1.13)

I use MLE to estimate the measurement system. The likelihood function is:

L=

N ZZ
Y
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... × feT6 (XT i , T6 i, γ , γ )

⎦ dF (θA )dF (θB )

(1.14)

I include an alternative setting of the factors in Appendix A, which takes the
non-triangular pattern of the loading system.
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1.5

Main Results

1.5.1

Latent Abilities

Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 show the estimates of the measurement system (1.11)
used to identify the two latent abilities—general intelligence and extra mathematical
ability—for women and men, respectively. The set of controls XT includes annual
state-averaged freshmen graduation rate (AFGR) on the year of each student graduated from high school, home region13 ﬁx eﬀects and ﬁrst enrollment semester ﬁx
eﬀects14 . The loadings of general intelligence on all six test scores are signiﬁcantly
positive, meaning that both increase in general intelligence and extra mathematical
ability will increase the 6 scores, as expected. Speciﬁcally, for example, one standard deviation increase in an average woman’s general intelligence will increase her
ACTEnglish by 3.94 points and her ACTM ath by 2.91 points. One standard deviation
increase in an average woman’s extra mathematical ability will increase her ACTM ath
by 2.72 points. Again, one should be cautious when interpreting the estimates of
the two latent abilities in this paper. Extra math ability is the factor assumed to
be orthogonal to general intelligence. It is measured by the “left over” variations
of the test scores—ACTM ath , ACTScience and HSGP A—after general intelligence is
measured. Thus, we should interpret the estimates of extra mathematical ability as
conditioning on average level of general intelligence.
The predicted distributions of the latent abilities are shown in Figure 1.1 and
Figure 1.2. They both show that the latent ability distributions are far from normal.
Particularly, both female and male general intelligence distribution have a fat right
tail. Especially for women, there is an obvious hump on the right tail. This implies
the proportion of high-ability women is relatively big, compared to that of men.
13

I deﬁne 6 home regions according to the Census regions: Northeast, South, West, Midwest, and
Indiana. It is important to have Indiana as a home region itself, because there are many in-state
students and they are likely to be diﬀerent from out-of-state students in educational and family
backgrounds.
14
Table 1.5 lists the controls in each model and exclusion restrictions.
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1.5.2

The Roy Model

Major Selection
Table 1.6 shows the eﬀect of abilities on selection between STEM and non-STEM
majors. Column (1) and (2) show the marginal eﬀects of the probit at the means for
women and men, respectively. To take into consideration of cohort speciﬁc eﬀects, I
control for enrollment calendar year ﬁxed eﬀects, enrollment semester ﬁxed eﬀects,
degree calendar year ﬁxed eﬀects, degree semester ﬁxed eﬀects, number of graduates
in the same major15 in the same year, and number of female graduates in the same
major in the same year.
Both general intelligence and extra mathematical ability are signiﬁcant determinants of the likelihood of graduating with a STEM degree. Speciﬁcally, a one
standard deviation increase in an average woman’s general intelligence will increase
her probability of graduating with a STEM degree by 17.16 percentage points; and
a one standard deviation increase in an average man’s general intelligence will increase his likelihood of graduating with a STEM degree by 23.36 percentage points.
These estimates are large and statistically signiﬁcant. The marginal eﬀect of general
intelligence on major choice of men are larger than that of their female counterparts.
Similarly, extra mathematical ability is an signiﬁcantly more important determinant
on major choice for men than for women. A one standard deviation increase in an
average man’s extra mathematical ability will raise his likelihood of graduating with
a STEM degree by 14.02 percentage points; while that number is 9.52 for an average
woman.
On average, women sort less on both general intelligence and extra mathematical
ability than their male counterparts. Potential explanations could be that, ﬁrst,
women are less sensitive to their abilities when making the decision between majoring
in STEM and non-STEM. I cannot rule out the possibility that they may think
they are not good enough for STEM. Second, other factors are more dominating
15

A major is deﬁned by a 6-digit level CIP code (Classiﬁcation of Instructional Programs).
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for women’s major decision, which is consistent to the literature on gender speciﬁc
preference on college majors. Last, women might be more critical about their abilities
or more easily to get discouraged about their performance on coursework (Ahn et al.,
2015). Unfortunately, I do not capture the major switching behavior in this study;
thus I cannot draw any conclusion about women.

Job Selection
Students who graduated with a degree in STEM face the choice between STEM
and non-STEM jobs. As mentioned above, I restrict the model to only allow STEM
graduates to choose between the two types of jobs. In this sense, non-STEM graduates
are automatically ﬁlled in non-STEM jobs. To capture the macroeconomic condition
and job market intensity in a certain year, I control for degree year ﬁxed eﬀects. I
include controls for home state demand of STEM worker (number of STEM occupations in home state), home region ﬁx eﬀects, considering that people might take home
location into account when making job decision. I also control for total number of
Purdue graduates in the same major and number of Purdue female graduates in the
same major.
Table 1.7 shows the marginal eﬀects of latent abilities on probability of working
in STEM for STEM major graduates. Compared to major selection, both latent
abilities are much weaker determinants of the likelihood of working in a STEM job.
The weak estimates imply that neither men nor women select between STEM and
non-STEM job based on their abilities. This is not surprising: giving the fact that
they have already graduated with a STEM degree, they should be similarly capable
for a STEM job.
Speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation increase in general intelligence for an average
female STEM graduate leads to an increase in her likelihood of working in STEM
by 6.83 percentage points. For an average male STEM graduate, a one standard
deviation increase in his general intelligence will increase his probability of staying
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STEM by 4.11 percentage points. The sorting on general intelligence when making job
decision is not statistically diﬀerent between women and men. Even though there is no
gender diﬀerences in these level changes in likelihood of staying in STEM, the percent
changes are quite diﬀerent. The 6.83 percentage points increase in female STEM
graduates’ likelihood in staying in STEM will push up the fraction of Purdue female
STEM graduates staying in STEM after graduation on the base of 73.1% by 9.34
percent. But in contrast, the 4.11 percentage points increase in men’s probability in
working in STEM will only increase the the fraction of Purdue male STEM graduates
in STEM jobs on the base of 81.2% by 5.06 percent.
Compared to general intelligence, extra mathematical ability is a less important
determinant in job decision for STEM graduates. A one standard deviation increase
in an average female STEM graduate’s extra mathematical ability will increase her
likelihood of working in STEM by 5.17 percentage points; for men, that is 3.21 percentage points.

Salary
Table 1.8 and Table 1.9 show the salary returns to abilities for male and female who
endogenously sort into diﬀerent majors and jobs16 . Column (1) to (3) in each table
present the coeﬃcients of interest for three types of men/women—graduating with a
STEM degree and working in STEM, graduating with a STEM degree and working in
non-STEM, and graduating with a non-STEM degree and working in non-STEM—
respectively. For simplicity, I denote these three types of men as M ale11 , M ale10 ,
and M ale00 ; same for women. I control for state-level annual unemployment rate,
job region ﬁxed eﬀects17 , national annual total number of graduates, total number
of graduates in STEM, total number of female graduates, total number of female
16

The full table of estimates is in Appendix B.4, B.5, and B.6.
I deﬁned 10 job regions according to the Census regional devisions: “New England”, “MidAtlantic”, “East North Central”, “West North Central”, “South Atlantic”, “East South Central”,
“West South Central”, “Mountain”, “Paciﬁc”, and “Indiana”. It is important to have Indiana as a
regional devision here, because there is a large fraction of in-state students; and a large fraction of
them will hold a in-state job after graduation.

17
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STEM graduates, fraction of STEM employment in total employment, STEM and
non-STEM total employment.
In general, both general intelligence and extra mathematical ability have positive
returns to salary for all three types of women and men. Women are more rewarded
for both of their abilities then men, comparing the magnitude of the estimates. One
thing to note, all types of women—F emale11 , F emale10 and F emale00 —are rewarded
for their extra mathematical ability. For an average woman who graduates with nonSTEM degree and works in a non-STEM job, a one standard deviation increase in
her extra mathematical ability will increase her annual salary by $2474. In contrast,
M ale00 has no signiﬁcant return to extra mathematical ability. This can be one explanation that why women are less likely to enroll in STEM major: women with high
extra mathematical ability are more rewarded outside of STEM ﬁeld relative to men.
Although the mechanism is inconclusive without further evidence, the suggestion here
is interesting and straightforward: women should invest in extra mathematical ability.
Comparing within gender, M ale10 and M ale00 have smaller salary return to general intelligence, relative to M ale11 . However, those estimates are not statistically
diﬀerent from each other. F emale11 and F emale10 have signiﬁcantly higher returns to
general intelligence compared to F emale00 , again suggesting that high-ability women
should major in STEM.

Model Fit
Table 1.11 shows that the model ﬁts the actual data well, with respect to the
test scores. Both the ﬁrst and second moments are close to the data. Figures 1.8,
and Figure 1.7 show the cumulative distribution of the test scores, for male and
female. Generally speaking, Male’s ﬁts better than female’s. The data for high school
GPA and communication 114 grade points are lumpy because these two variables are
discrete. Tables 1.10 presents evidence on the models’ goodness-of-ﬁt on the ﬁrst
and second moments of major choice (DM ), job choice (DJ ) and salary (Salary11 ,
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Salary10 , and Salary00 ). They are product of 1,000,000 simulations of the model
based on bootstrapping 1000 times from the estimates and 1000 random draws from
the factor distributions within each bootstrap. Comparing the “Data” and the “Model
Prediction”, it is clear that the model accurately predicts the means and standard
deviations for each outcome of both genders. This provides conﬁdence about the fact
that the counterfactuals predicted by the model are appropriate.

1.5.3

The Distributions of Abilities of The Three Career Paths

To reveal the link between latent abilities and the endogenous choices between
STEM and non-STEM major and job, I construct Figure 1.3–Figure 1.6. Figure 1.3
presents the distributions of general intelligence of M ale00 , M ale10 , and M ale11 , from
the left to the right. All three distributions are far from normal. Comparing M ale00
to the other two, it is clear that men with a STEM degree are having signiﬁcantly
higher general intelligence compared to men with a non-STEM degree. Particularly,
both the distributions of M ale10 and the M ale11 have a slight hump on the right
tails, indicating that men with relatively high general intelligence sort into STEM
majors. Figure 1.4 shows the distributions of extra mathematical ability of the three
categories of men. Similarly, the distribution of M ale00 is apart from the distributions
of M ale10 and M ale11 , indicating men with high extra mathematical ability are more
likely to be majoring in STEM.
Women’s sorting behavior in major decision is surprisingly diﬀerent from men’s.
Figure 1.5 shows general intelligence distributions of F emale00 , F emale10 , and F emale11 .
Remarkably, high-ability women are more likely to major in non-STEM, relative to
their male counterparts. The hump on the right tail of the distribution of F emale00
suggests that a mass of women with high general intelligence graduate with nonSTEM majors. We don’t see this in the distribution of M ale00 . Moreover, there
is little evidence of sorting on extra mathematical ability among women: the three
distributions in Figure 1.6 are equally apart from each other. This suggests that ex-
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tra mathematical ability is a weaker determinant for women to make major decision
relative to men.
Overall, the diﬀerence of the sorting behavior in major decision between men
and women revealed by the ability distributions mirrors my ﬁnding in Table 1.6;
that is, on average, men sort more on both abilities than women. Furthermore,
women of every level of ability are less likely to major in STEM or work in STEM,
compared to their male counterparts. Evidence is provided by Table 1.12 and 1.13,
which show the predicted values of majoring in STEM (working in STEM) by general
intelligence deciles and extra mathematical ability deciles, respectively. We see that
women’s probability of majoring in STEM (Panel A) or probability of working in
STEM (Panel B) is smaller than men’s from ability decile 1 to 10. Moreover, the
gender diﬀerence on the right tail of the ability distribution is slightly larger. Highability (right tail) women seem to be “ignoring” or misreading their abilities when
making major decision. This is very interesting but not surprising: one potential
explanation comes from the literature about women being too critical about their
skills and less conﬁdent relative to men (Ahn et al., 2015). Furthermore, the fact that
the distributions of 10 and 11—for both gender—are close to each other suggests that
neither men nor women sort greatly on abilities when making job decision, which is
consistent with estimates in Table 1.7.

1.6

Counterfactuals

1.6.1

The Eﬀect of Majoring in STEM

To understand the eﬀect of majoring in STEM, I calculate the ATE (average
treatment eﬀect)of majoring in STEM for women and men, respectively.
AT EM = E[Y10 − Y00 |θ, x]
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where the treatment is majoring in STEM, noted as subscript M . Panel A in Table 1.14 shows the averaged ATE of majoring in STEM over the whole distribution of
ability. An average female majoring in non-STEM and working in non-STEM would
have earned $7,171 more if she had majoring in STEM and working in non-STEM.
That number is $7,312 to an average male. On average, there is no gender diﬀerence
in the ATE of majoring STEM.
To show the variation of ATE across the ability distribution, I calculate ATE by
each ability decile. Figure 1.9 shows the ATE of majoring in STEM for both genders
over the deciles of f1 , general intelligence. Similarly, Figure 1.10 shows the ATE of
majoring in STEM for both genders over the deciles of f2 , extra mathematical ability.
Both curves on the left and right panels are upward sloping, indicating positive returns
to abilities. There is barely any gender diﬀerence on the level of ATE of majoring
in STEM. Female’s ATE over both ability distributions have slightly larger standard
deviation, implying that among individuals with the same ability, female’s returns to
STEM degree varies more than male’s.
To capture the counterfactuals for individuals on the margin of the treatment, I
calculate the MTE (marginal treatment eﬀect) of majoring in STEM for female and
male, respectively.
M T Ei = E[Y10 − Y00 |P r(XM,i β M + αM,A θiA + αM,B θiB = eiM ) = 1]
where M T Ei is the treatment eﬀect of majoring in STEM for individuals who are
indiﬀerent of majoring in STEM, having observable characteristics XM,i , and unobserved abilities θiA and θiB .
Figure 1.11 and Figure 1.12 present the MTE of majoring in STEM for both
genders across the deciles of general intelligence and math ability. In general, MTEs
are upward sloping, except male’s MTE across general intelligence ability (the right
panel of Figure 1.11, which is insigniﬁcantly downward slopping. Comparing ATE
of majoring in STEM (Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10) and MTE of majoring in STEM
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(Figure 1.11 and Figure 1.12), they are very similar except that the MTEs have
signiﬁcant larger standard deviations. This is probably because 1. we are comparing
fewer individuals on the margin within the same ability deciles; 2. the observable
characteristics of individuals on the margin vary a lot more than an average individual.

1.6.2

The Eﬀect of Working in STEM

In the Section 1.5.2, I discuss the fact that women are less likely to stay in STEM
after they graduated with a STEM degree and argue that it is not due to gender
diﬀerences in sorting on abilities. The next question is “how much do people lose
by opting out of STEM after getting STEM degrees?” To answer that, I calculate
the ATE of having a STEM job relative to having a non-STEM job for those who
graduated with a STEM degree.
AT EJ = E[Y11 − Y10 |θ, x, DM = 1]
Panel B in Table 1.14 shows the averaged ATE of working in STEM over the
whole ability space. For a woman who is picked at random from the sample of
women who graduated with a STEM degree, working in a STEM job would increase
her annual salary by $6,480 than working in a non-STEM job. Although this number
is not extraordinarily large, compared to male’s averaged ATE, $2,612, the eﬀect of
working in STEM for an average female STEM graduate is signiﬁcantly larger than
that of her male counterpart.
Figure 1.13 and Figure 1.14 also shows that female’s ATE of working in STEM
is larger than male’s across deciles of both abilities. One may notice that the ATE
is downward sloping across deciles of extra mathematical ability. This is due to the
fact that the salary return to extra mathematical ability for group 10 (STEM degree
and non-STEM job) is higher than that for group 11 (STEM degrees and STEM
jobs). This implies that the returns to working in STEM is positive across the entire
distribution of extra mathematical ability; but with a declining marginal return.
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Again, I present the MTE of working in STEM, which can be written as follows.
M T Ei = E[Y11 − Y10 |P r(XJ,i β J + αJ,A θiA + αJ,B θiB = eiJ ) = 1, DM = 1]
Figure 1.15 and Figure 1.16 depict the marginal treatment eﬀect of working in
STEM for each gender over the deciles of each abilities. The trends look similar to
the ﬁgures of ATE above. However, female’s MTE of working in STEM at each ability
decile is slightly larger than female’s ATE of working in STEM. Yet this is not true
for the males. Additionally, we can see the gender diﬀerences in the MTE of working
in STEM as in the ATE. Male’s MTE of majoring in STEM is signiﬁcantly lower
than that of female, suggesting that the eﬀect of working in STEM for females who
are on the margin is signiﬁcantly larger than that of their male counterparts.

1.6.3

The Eﬀect of Majoring and Working in STEM

AT EM = E[Y11 − Y00 |θ, x]
Now I compare two groups in distance, one work in STEM jobs with STEM degrees, the other work in non-STEM jobs with non-STEM degrees. This is the counterfactural of working in STEM for those who do not have STEM degrees. Generally
speaking, an average woman is more rewarded than an average man for majoring in
STEM, revealing by Panel C in Table 1.14. Speciﬁcally, an average woman who is
picked at random from the entire female sample would earn $13,651 more if she works
in STEM with a STEM degree rather than works in non-STEM with a non-STEM
degree. That number is only $9,925 for an average man, which is statistically lower.
It is important to notice that there is no gender diﬀerence in treatment eﬀect of majoring in STEM; and the gender diﬀerence of treatment eﬀect of working in STEM is
close to the gender diﬀerences in treatment eﬀects to majoring and working in STEM.
Thus, to sum up: 1. on average, both women and men have positive treatment eﬀect
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of majoring and working in STEM; 2. the gender diﬀerences in treatment eﬀect in
majoring in STEM can be attributed to gender diﬀerences in rewards for a STEM
job.
Figure 1.17 and Figure 1.18 show the ATE of majoring and working in STEM
across ability deciles. Again, the level of female’s ATE are above the level of male’s
ATE, indicating that women are more rewarded in majoring and working in STEM.
Ironically, the fact is that women are less likely to major in STEM and more to opt
out.

1.6.4

Foregone Earnings of the High-Ability Women And the Gender
Wage Gap

Having seen the eﬀect of majoring and working in STEM by ability deciles, I argue
that high-ability women could have earned a lot more had they got a STEM degree and
worked in STEM. Recall the simulated general intelligence distribution of F emale00
group in Figure 1.5. Compared with M ale00 group in Figure 1.3, F emale00 has a lump
on the right tail, implying high-ability women are less likely to majoring in STEM
than high-ability men. To quantify the total losses in terms of salary for high-ability
non-STEM women, I integrate the average treatment eﬀect of majoring in STEM over
the shadowed area on Figure 1.19. This area created by the interaction of general
intelligence distribution of M ale00 with that of F emale00 , where there is a mass of
the women distributed on the hump-shaped region of general intelligence distribution
of F emale00 . Assuming high-ability women act like high-ability men when making
major decision (i.e. the individuals distributed on the right tail of general intelligence
distribution of F emale00 be like that of M ale00 ), how much would they gain?
The value generated by the shadowed area is $772, which explains 9.42% of the
gender wage gap. The gender wage gap, $8198, is calculated by subtracting Purdue
male graduates’ average annual salary by Purdue female graduates’ average annual
salary. Although 9.42% is not a gigantic number at the ﬁrst glance, one should not
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take it for granted: the 9.42% of the gender wage gap is only contributed by the
high-ability women who make up the mass on the right tail of F emale00 distribution;
those high-ability women only make up 5.60% of the Purdue female sample. Thus,
one should not interpret as every woman gains $772 per year by majoring in STEM,
which is clearly minuscule. Instead, the 9.42% is all attributed to the 5.60% highability women, who are most likely to be capable of majoring in STEM; and each of
them would have gained about $13,000–$20,000 per year.

1.6.5

Counterfacutals of Major Choice

Now let’s get back to the question that why women are less likely to major in
STEM than men. From the estimates in Table 1.6, we see that women and men sort
on abilities diﬀerently when making major choice. What if women had sorted the same
as men? What if women and men had the same distributions of abilities? Table 1.15
presents the results of counterfactual analysis on likelihood of majoring in STEM,
following the approach in Urzua (2008). The ﬁrst row displays the model predicted
proportion of graduates with a STEM major for female and male, respectively. For
easy understanding, I write out the expressions as follows.
f
f
m
m
(β M,f , XM
, αM,A,f , αM,B,f , θA,f , θB,f ) and DM
(β M,m , XM
, αM,A,m , αM,B,m , θA,m , θB,m ),
DM

where superscripts denote the gender.
The second row answers the question that what if women had sorted the same
as men. It shows that 37.49% of women would graduate in STEM when women are asf
f
sumed to have the the same loadings as men (DM
(β M,f , XM
, αM,A,m , αM,B,m , θA,f , θB,f )).

The third row answers that what if women had had men’s abilities. It shows women’s
proportion of graduates in STEM increases to 39.58% when women are assumed to
f
f
have the same ability distributions as men (DM
(β M,f , XM
, αM,A,f , αM,B,f , θA,m , θB,m )).

Furthermore, by assuming that women had both the same abilities and the same
loadings of abilities, the proportion of graduates in STEM would be 40.37%. These
counterfactuals indicate that women would be slightly more likely to major in STEM,
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or the gender diﬀerences in STEM major would have shrunken, had they possessed
the same ability distributions or evaluated their abilities in the same way as men; but
the changes are not statistically diﬀerent from the factual.
Giving that the gender diﬀerences in major choice is not primarily due to gender diﬀerences in the latent abilities or the sorting on abilities, I conduct the similar
exercises on the observables. Substituting men’s coeﬃcients of the observables for
f
f
(β M,m , XM
, αM,A,f , αM,B,f , θA,f , θB,f )), the proportion of female majorwomen’s (DM

ing in STEM would have signiﬁcantly increased to 42.53%. Substituting men’s observable variables for women’s, we get the proportion of female majoring in STEM as
57.63%. Given both male’s observable variables and the corresponding coeﬃcients to
women, the counterfactual estimate increases even more. Thus, the counterfactuals
in row 5–row 7 suggest that gender diﬀerences in major decision can be primarily attributed to observable characteristics, including economic conditions, labor demand
for STEM workers, and cohort eﬀects. Besides these, there is still unexplained gender
gap in major choice, which could be due to unobserved personal preferences. Those
unobserved gender-speciﬁc personal preferences are more dominating when women
are making major choice, as shown in the literature.

1.6.6

Counterfactuals for Job Choice

The weak determinants in the job model imply that neither men nor women select
greatly between STEM and non-STEM job based on their abilities. This is very
interesting, given the fact that they have already graduated with a STEM degree.
Another question this paper intends to answer is why female STEM graduates choose
diﬀerent jobs than their male counterparts. Given that it is not due to the diﬀerential
sorting behavior on abilities from the results shown in Table 1.7, no wonder that
substituting women’s latent abilities or men’s returns to abilities with men’s does not
close the gender gap in job decision (see row 2 to row 4 in Table 1.16). I then seek
answers from the gender diﬀerences in the observable characteristics.
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To do so, I show the proportion of female STEM workers in female STEM graduates when compensating them with men’s returns to the observable characteristics
(DJf (β J,m , XJf , αJ,A,f , αJ,B,f , θA,f , θB,f )). Row 5 in Table 1.16 shows that women would
have been more likely to stay in STEM when assumed they had the same returns to
the observable characteristics as men. Particularly, there would be 75.12% female
STEM graduates stay in STEM ﬁeld, instead of the factual, 70.05%. This 5 percentage points increase explains 41.5% of gender gap of choosing between a STEM
job and a non-STEM job among STEM graduates. The implication here is similar
to the counterfactual analysis on major decision: gender diﬀerences in job choice
among STEM graduates can be explained by gender diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient of
the observables but not the latent abilities.
After a full decomposition of the predictors in the job selection model, I ﬁnd that
the region where one is from is a major factor for female STEM graduates and their
decision to pursue a STEM or non-STEM job. In Table 1.17, column (1) shows the
counterfactuals of excluding the each variable, and column (2) shows the counterfactuals of substituting women’s each coeﬃcient with men’s. Giving men’s home region
ﬁxed eﬀects to women, the gender gap on job choice is fully closed. Additionally,
none of the other predictors signiﬁcantly explains the gender gap. Although this is
not conclusive, the potential mechanism is very interesting: there may be a trade-oﬀ
between non-STEM job at home state and high-paying STEM job opportunity away
from home for female STEM graduates. Table 1.18 also shows supportive evidence:
those who go back to their home state are more likely to opt out of STEM ﬁelds.
This ﬁnding sheds new light on the studies about career choices of female STEM
graduates; and even on a broader topic of women’s career choices.

1.7

Policy Implications
A possible policy implication of the ﬁndings in this paper is to encourage pro-

grams or activities that improve the awareness of their own abilities of high school
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girls. Transcripts of SAT and ACT informs high school students about their percentile rankings in these standardized tests, which indicate how they did compared
to everyone else. However, that is not informative enough for college major decision.
High school students and their parents may not know what those scores and percentile
rankings mean in terms of potential careers.
The Career Mapping Visualization System created by a research group18 funded
by Eli Lilly has made a visualization tool to help high school students understand the
requirements for graduating from a certain major and the requirements for each occupation19 . This facilitates high school students, parents and teachers to comprehend
the requirement of each career path and the expected abilities among their peers, and
to have an appropriate expectation on their career outcome.
Also, it is crucial to make high school girls more informed about the returns to a
STEM education. It is costly to train students to be “ready” for STEM, why don’t we
attract the “already-ready” ones—the high-ability women in this study—to major in
STEM? Considering how much would have been made by the high-ability women, we
should encourage state funded program designed to attract high-ability high school
girls to STEM majors, which could be ﬁnanced by the tax revenue equivalent to the
tax from the 9.4% gain. For instance, state funded program for campus visit of middle
or high school girls; for instance, UT Austin’s Girl’s Day20 .

1.8

Conclusion
This paper investigates the gender diﬀerences in ability sorting in major and job

choices by applying an extended Roy model of unobserved heterogeneity to explore
the endogenous sequential decisions: the choice between a STEM and non-STEM
major and the choice between a STEM and non-STEM job. I ﬁnd that women sort
less on abilities when making major decisions; and high-ability women are more likely
18

Lilly Endowment for “Transforming Indiana into a Magnet for High Technology Jobs”.
https://va.tech.purdue.edu/careerVis/
20
https://girlday.utexas.edu
19
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to choose non-STEM major, compared to men. By majoring in non-STEM majors,
high-ability women give up as much as $13,000–$20,000 annual salary, which in total
explains about 9.4% of the gender wage gap.
There are several potential explanations for this sorting behavior among highability women. I cannot rule out the possibility that they may think they are not
good enough for STEM. Additionally, they may be not informed well about the
pecuniary value of the career paths associated with their abilities. Last but not least,
those high-ability women could intentionally choose the non-STEM career path to
have the nonpecuniary value of pursuing their ideal but low-paying jobs or taking
care of family, as suggested in the literature.
Another contribution of this paper is to aﬃrm that gender gap on job choice
is not due to diﬀerent sorting on abilities, but to other observable or unobserved
characteristics. Home region is important in the job decision for women; women
STEM graduates who go back home are more likely to opt out of STEM. The future
research should investigate the eﬀect of family on female STEM graduates’ job choice
and seek answers for whether they are going back home for a familiar social network,
or marriage or access to child care.
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Table 1.1.: Sample Selection
Sample
All
Six Scores Complete
Six Scores Complete (Domestic Student)
First Destination Survey Complete
Valid Self-Reported Salary

Total Female
18,904
8,763
10,516
4,682
10,282
4,565
4,192
1,687
3,055
1,145

Male
10,141
5,834
5,640
2,505
1,910

Note: The sample includes undergraduate students graduated between 2005–2014. Six scores are:
ACT English, ACT Reading, ACT Science, ACT Math, grade points of Communication 114 (required
for all Purdue freshmen) and high school GPA. A valid self-reported salary means the graduate selfreported a positive annual salary.
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Table 1.2.: Summary statistics
Variable
Panel A. Females
ACT English
COM114 grade points
ACT Reading
ACT Science
HS GPA
exp(HS GPA)
ACT Math
Self-reported Annual Salary
STEM Major
STEM Job
STEM Major, STEM Job

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

25.661
3.526
25.940
24.668
3.532
36.971
25.645
45179.963
0.370
0.271
0.731

4.617
0.570
4.944
3.960
0.426
13.043
4.517
14365.635
0.483
0.445
0.444

11
1
12
12
2
7.389
15
8000
0
0
0

36
4
36
36
4
54.598
36
101000
1
1
1

1145
1145
1145
1145
1145
1145
1145
1145
1145
1145
424

Panel A. Males
ACT English
COM114 grade points
ACT Reading
ACT Science
HS GPA
exp(HS GPA)
ACT Math
Self-reported Annual Salary
STEM Major
STEM Job
STEM Major, STEM Job

25.507
3.339
26.278
26.730
3.483
35.290
28.237
53427.169
0.634
0.516
0.812

4.640
0.630
4.951
4.398
0.427
12.868
4.185
13178.711
0.482
0.5
0.391

11
1
8
11
2
7.389
15
5250
0
0
0

36
4
36
36
4
54.598
36
107000
1
1
1

1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1211

Note: The sample includes undergraduate students graduated from 2005–2014. Standard test of
ACT English, ACT Reading, ACT Science, and ACT Math have minimum of 0 and maximum of
36. COM114 grade points range from 2-4. Whoever fail the class (grade points less than 2) has
to re-take the class in order to graduate; and I do not observe dropouts. “exp(HS GPA)” is the
exponential of high school GPA, which is used in the estimation instead of HS GPA. Self-reported
Annual Salary is nominal and in USD.
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Table 1.3.: Identiﬁcation of Abilities at College Entrance, Female
Dependent Var
Home Region: Indiana
Home Region: Midwest
Home Region: Northeast
Home Region: South
AFGR
First Term Semester: Fall
First Term Semester: Spring
General Intelligence
Extra Math Ability
Constant

ACT E
-0.569
(0.773)
1.044
(0.783)
-1.389
(1.158)
2.594**
(1.066)
0.122***
(0.039)
2.042*
(1.084)
-1.536
(1.552)
1.127***
(0.020)

COM114
-0.128
(0.094)
-0.171*
(0.099)
-0.260*
(0.147)
-0.073
(0.120)
0.013**
(0.005)
-0.112
(0.178)
-0.050
(0.258)
0.045***
(0.005)

ACT R
-0.660
(0.827)
0.210
(0.853)
-0.893
(1.264)
1.918*
(1.108)
0.103**
(0.043)
2.557*
(1.327)
0.597
(1.905)
1
X

ACT S
HSGPA ACT M
-1.209***
1.889
-0.801
(0.449)
(1.832)
(0.510)
-0.201
-3.313*
0.335
(0.477)
(1.946)
(0.547)
-0.897
-1.779
0.0322
(0.709)
(2.892)
(0.797)
1.141**
2.550
1.839***
(0.573)
(2.334)
(0.656)
0.113*** 0.566*** 0.111***
(0.0255)
(0.103)
(0.030)
1.550*
8.124** 2.827**
(0.942)
(3.727)
(1.306)
-1.167
-4.794
-1.524
(1.301)
(5.257)
(1.648)
0.771*** 1.780*** 0.832***
(0.025)
(0.097)
(0.029)
0.361*** 1.199***
1
(0.043)
(0.161)
X
15.706*** 15.13***
-13.83
14.54***
(3.486)
(2.128)
(8.585)
(2.620)

14.043*** 2.754***
(3.088)
( 0.427)
Observations
1,145
Note: Each column is a separate regression speciﬁed in Equation 1.11. All columns have the
same observations: 1145. The loading of General Intelligence is normalized to one in regression
of ACTReading , so that General Intelligence takes the metrics of ACTReading . The loading of Extra
Mathematical Ability is normalized to one in regression of ACTM ath , so that Extra Mathematical
Ability takes the metrics of ACTM ath . I control for annual state-averaged freshmen graduation rate
(AFGR) on the year of each student graduated from high school, home census region ﬁxed eﬀects
and ﬁrst enrollment semester ﬁx eﬀects.
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Table 1.4.: Identiﬁcation of Abilities at College Entrance, Male
ACT E
-2.216***
(0.687)
Home Region: Midwest
-0.995
(0.736)
Home Region: Northeast
-1.441
(0.978)
Home Region: South
0.0362
(0.742)
AFGR
0.169***
(0.031)
First Term Semester: Fall
4.941***
(1.011)
First Term Semester: Spring 2.794**
(1.315)
General Intelligence
1.151***
(0.017)
Math Ability
Home Region: Indiana

Constant

COM114
-0.071
(0.080)
-0.206**
(0.085)
-0.204*
(0.119)
-0.013
(0.093)
0.019***
(0.004)
0.210
(0.179)
-0.232
(0.225)
0.045***
(0.004)

ACT R
-1.981***
(0.703)
-1.111
(0.748)
-1.138
(1.013)
-0.068
(0.777)
0.089**
(0.034)
3.610**
(1.237)
1.270
(1.578)
1
X

ACT S
-1.831***
(0.397)
-0.427
(0.421)
-0.290
(0.577)
0.188
(0.479)
0.108***
(0.0224)
5.844***
(0.853)
4.297***
(1.110)
0.831***
(0.022)
0.455***
( 0.029)
13.607***
(1.888)

HSGPA
ACT M
-0.180
-1.388***
(1.437)
(0.394)
-5.342***
-0.267
(1.519)
(0.421)
-3.640*
-0.415
(2.120)
(0.536)
-0.141
0.704
(1.699)
(0.518)
0.654***
0.124***
(0.0810)
(0.0226)
13.67***
6.089***
(3.228)
(0.670)
10.26**
4.402***
(4.100)
(1.019)
1.557***
0.729***
(0.078)
(0.021)
1.107***
1
(0.103)
X
-25.932*** 13.383***
(6.891)
(1.810)

9.045*** 2.204*** 17.235***
(2.582)
(0.379)
(2.880)
Observations
1,910
Note: Each column is a separate regression speciﬁed in Equation 1.11. All columns have the
same observations: 1910. The loading of General Intelligence is normalized to one in regression
of ACTReading , so that General Intelligence takes the metrics of ACTReading . The loading of Extra
Mathematical Ability is normalized to one in regression of ACTM ath , so that Extra Mathematical
Ability takes the metrics of ACTM ath . I control for annual state-averaged freshmen graduation rate
(AFGR) on the year of each student graduated from high school, home census region ﬁxed eﬀects
and ﬁrst enrollment semester ﬁx eﬀects.
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Table 1.5.: Observed Controls in Each Model (Exclusion Restrictions)

Variables

Controls
XT

Averaged Freshmen Graduation Rate (AFGR)
First Enrollment Year Fixed Eﬀects
First Enrollment Semester Fixed Eﬀects
Home (Census) Region Fixed Eﬀects
Degree Year Fixed Eﬀects
Degree Semester Fixed Eﬀects
# Purdue Graduates in Same Major
# Purdue Female Graduates in Same Major
State-level STEM Employment
STEM Fraction of Total Employment
# STEM Total Employment
# nonSTEM Total Employment
# Total Graduates
# STEM Major Graduates
# Female Graduates
# Female STEM Major Graduates
State Annual Unemployment Rate
Job Location Region Fixed Eﬀects

XM

XJ

XY

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Table 1.6.: Likelihood of Graduating with A STEM Major
(1)
(2)
Female
Male
Marginal Eﬀects at the Mean
General Intelligence 0.048***
(0.0058)

0.066***
(0.0056)

Extra Math Ability

0.049***
(0.0063)
1910

N

0.034***
(0.0084)
1145

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: Column (1) and column (2) show the marginal eﬀect of probit at the means for the female
and male sample, respectively. All marginal eﬀects reﬂect to changes in probability of graduating in
STEM with one unit increase in the corresponding ability. The standard deviation of female’s and
male’s General Intelligence is 3.576 and 3.539; the standard deviation of female’s and male’s Extra
Mathematical Ability is 2.801 and 2.862. The dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is
dummy of majoring in STEM. Number of Purdue graduates in the same major, number of Purdue
female graduates in the same major, ﬁrst enrollment year, ﬁrst enrollment semester, degree year
ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled but not shown in this table for short. See Table B.2 for the full table.
The factor loadings are also shown in the full table.
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Table 1.7.: Likelihood of STEM Graduates Work in STEM Occupations
(1)
(2)
Female
Male
Marginal Eﬀects at the Mean
General Intelligence

0.0191*
(0.0109)

0.0116**
(0.0059)

Mathematical Ability

0.0190
(0.0159)
1145

0.0116*
(0.0070)
1910

N

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: Column (1) and column (2) show the marginal eﬀect of probit at the means for the female and
male sample, respectively. All marginal eﬀects reﬂect to changes in probability of working in STEM
with one unit increase in the corresponding ability of STEM graduates. The standard deviation of
female’s and male’s General Intelligence is 3.496 and 3.349; the standard deviation of female’s and
male’s Extra Mathematical Ability is 2.723 and 2.771. The dependent variable in both column (1)
and (2) is dummy of majoring in STEM. Number of Purdue graduates in the same major, number
of Purdue female graduates in the same major, home state STEM demand, degree year ﬁxed eﬀects,
home region ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled but not shown in this table for short. See Table B.3 for the
full table. The factor loadings are also shown in the full table.
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Table 1.8.: Salary for Males
(1)
VARIABLES
Salary11
Unemployment Rate at Job State
-838.5**
(357.7)
STEM Employment Fraction
-178,101
(1.719e+06)
# Employment in STEM Occupations
-0.000123
(0.0141)
# Employment in nonSTEM Occupations
-3.45e-05
(0.000584)
# Graduates
1.208*
(0.663)
# STEM Major Graduates
-1.200
(1.278)
# Female Graduates
-2.124
(1.524)
# Female STEM Major Graduates
2.515
(3.606)
General Intelligence
422.7***
(129.1)
Mathematical Ability
716.3***
(160.3)
Constant
58,383
(116,660)
Observations
1,910

(2)
(3)
Salary10
Salary00
-1,059
-143.3
(883.3)
(575.4)
-2.582e+06
-51,061
(4.308e+06) (2.321e+06)
0.0257
0.00205
(0.0360)
(0.0190)
-0.000972
-5.34e-05
(0.00149)
(0.000789)
2.879
0.130
(1.764)
(0.932)
-3.630
-1.450
(2.982)
(1.795)
-6.176
-0.834
(3.882)
(2.114)
10.05
4.488
(8.119)
(4.967)
156.1
172.7
(343.3)
(175.4)
1,102***
303.6
(374.5)
(192.7)
454,814
182,691
(313,697)
(159,320)

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Column (1)–(3) separately show the estimates for men who graduate in STEM and work in
STEM (Salary11 ), men who graduate in STEM and work in non-STEM (Salary10 ), and men who
graduates in non-STEM and work in non-STEM (Salary00 ). The dependent variable in all columns
is annual salary in USD. Census region of job ﬁxed eﬀects are included but not shown. See Table
B.4 for full table.
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Table 1.9.: Salary for Females
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Salary11
Salary10
Salary00
Unemployment Rate at Job State
-134.2
241.1
-998.8
(619.7)
(1,577)
(614.0)
STEM Employment Fraction
-3.019e+06 -2.606e+06 -2.052e+06
(2.969e+06) (7.243e+06) (2.284e+06)
# Employment in STEM Occupations
0.0177
0.0240
0.0140
(0.0241)
(0.0597)
(0.0190)
# Employment in nonSTEM Occupations
-0.000925
-0.000850
-0.000669
(0.00100)
(0.00248)
(0.000786)
# Graduates
1.090
0.333
0.966
(1.858)
(1.778)
(1.002)
# STEM Major Graduates
0.480
1.015
-0.749
(3.639)
(2.448)
(1.670)
# Female Graduates
-1.460
-0.488
-1.561
(4.362)
(3.534)
(2.129)
# Female STEM Major Graduates
-1.776
-2.775
1.300
(10.32)
(6.050)
(4.369)
General Intelligence
779.0***
310.3
154.7
(218.4)
(418.4)
(158.2)
Mathematical Ability
932.5***
1,513**
888.6***
(320.6)
(600.8)
(216.1)
Constant
16,546
202,269
75,694
(289,424)
(385,859)
(158,521)
Observations
1,145
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Column (1)–(3) separately show the estimates for women who graduate in STEM and work in
STEM (Salary11 ), women who graduate in STEM and work in non-STEM (Salary10 ), and women
who graduates in non-STEM and work in non-STEM (Salary00 ). The dependent variable in all
columns is annual salary in USD. Census region of job ﬁxed eﬀects are included but not shown. See
Table B.4 for full table.
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Table 1.10.: The Fit of the Model, Decisions and Salaries
Female

Male

Panel A. Prob(STEM Major)
Data
0.3703 (0.4831)
Model Prediction
0.3762 (0.4843)

0.6340 (0.4818)
0.6348 (0.4814)

Panel B. Prob(STEM Job)
Data
0.7311 (0.4439)
Model Prediction
0.6936 (0.4603)

0.8117 (0.3911)
0.7984 (0.4008)

Panel C. Salary11
Data
Model Prediction

58280 (11299)
53797 (12089)

58669 (11072)
56822 (11095)

Panel D. Salary10
Data
Model Prediction

48180 (14032)
47307 (14921)

54358 (13286)
54209 (13865)

Panel E. Salary00
Data
Model Prediction

39039 (11370)
40146 (11790)

45558 (11759)
46902 (11847)

Note: Predicted means and standard deviations (in the parenthesis) are not statistically diﬀerent
from the actual means and standard deviations at any conventional level of signiﬁcance, except the
predicted mean for female Salary11 is diﬀerent from the actual at 10% level. The predicted values
come from 1,000,000 simulations based on 1000 bootstraps of the estimated parameters of the model
and 1000 random draws from the two ability distributions within each bootstrap.
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Table 1.11.: The Fit of the Model, Test Scores

Panel A. ACT English
Data
Model Prediction

Female

Male

25.661 (4.617)
25.683 (4.352)

25.507 (4.640)
25.518 (4.343)

Panel B. Communication 114 Grade Points
Data
3.526 (0.570)
Model Prediction
3.523 (0.625)

3.339 (0.630)
3.339 (0.525)

Panel C. ACT Reading
Data
Model Prediction

25.940 (4.944)
25.973 (3.906)

26.278 (4.951)
26.278 (3.837)

Panel D. ACT Science
Data
Model Prediction

24.668 (3.960)
24.668 (3.408)

26.730 (4.398)
26.736 (3.547)

Panel E. exp(High School GPA)
Data
36.971 (13.043)
Model Prediction
37.107 (8.895)

35.290 (12.868)
35.330 (7.288)

Panel F. ACT Math
Data
Model Prediction

28.237 (4.185)
28.237 (4.017)

25.645 (4.517)
25.666 (5.227)

Note: The predicted values come from 5,000 simulations based on 50 bootstraps of the estimated
parameters of the model and 100 random draws from the two ability distributions within each
bootstrap.

44

Table 1.12.: The Predicted STEM Major Choice by General Intelligence (θ1 ) Deciles
Decile

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.283
(0.045)
0.535
(0.038 )

0.315
(0.046)
0.584
(0.037 )

0.346
(0.046)
0.627
(0.036)

0.378
(0.047)
0.668
(0.035)

0.415
(0.048)
0.709
(0.034 )

0.462
(0.049)
0.752
(0.033 )

0.528
(0.052)
0.797
(0.033 )

0.605
(0.054)
0.848
(0.029 )

Panel A. STEM Major
Female
Male

0.185
(0.043)
0.356
(0.044 )

0.246
(0.045)
0.472
(0.040 )

Panel B. STEM Job
Female

0.627
0.646
0.658
0.667
0.675
0.685
0.694
0.707
0.723
0.743
(0.129) (0.105) (0.094) (0.087) (0.081) (0.076) (0.071) (0.068) (0.067) (0.070)
Male
0.755
0.770
0.778
0.784
0.791
0.796
0.803
0.810
0.819
0.830
(0.065 ) (0.052 ) (0.046 ) (0.042 ) (0.039 ) (0.038 ) (0.036 ) (0.036 ) (0.037 ) (0.040 )
Note: This predicted values come from 1000,000 replications: 1000 bootstraps each with 1000
replications. Column 1 to 10 present the predicted probability of majoring in STEM (working in
STEM) by General Intelligence decile 1–10. Panel A and B show the predicted values of probability
of majoring in STEM and probability of working in STEM, respectively.
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Table 1.13.: The Predicted STEM Major Choice by Extra Math Ability (θ2 ) Deciles
Decile

1

2

3

4

5

6

0.328
(0.047)
0.579
(0.037 )

0. 348
(0.047 )
0.608
(0.036 )

0.367
(0.046)
0.632
(0.0356 )

0.384
(0.047)
0.655
(0.035 )

7

8

9

10

Panel A. STEM Major
Female
Male

0.253
(0.054 )
0. 462
(0.044 )

0.303
(0.049)
0.540
(0.039 )

0.403
0.423
0.450
(0.048 ) (0.049 ) (0.052 )
0.677
0.699
0.726
(0.035 ) (0.035 ) (0.035 )

0.505
(0.061 )
0.770
(0.034 )

Panel B. STEM Job
Female

0.629
0.654
0.667
0.677
0.685
0.693
0.701
0.710
0.720
0.741
(0.123) (0.098 ) (0.087) (0.081 ) (0.077 ) (0.074 ) (0.072 ) (0.071 ) (0.073 ) (0.083 )
Male
0.758
0.775
0.783
0.789
0.795
0.800
0.805
0.810
0.816
0.828
(0.060 ) (0.048 ) (0.043 ) (0.041 ) (0.039 ) (0.038 ) (0.037 ) (0.037 ) (0.038 ) (0.041 )
Note: This simulation results come from 1000,000 replications: 1000 bootstraps each with 1000
replications. Column 1 to 10 present the predicted probability of majoring in STEM (working in
STEM) by Extra Math Ability decile 1–10. Panel A and B show the predicted values of probability
of majoring in STEM and probability of working in STEM, respectively.
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Table 1.14.: Averaged (across ability distribution) Average Treatment Eﬀects
(1)
Female

(2)
Male

Panel A. Averaged ATE of Majoring in STEM (10 vs. 00)
ATE
N

7171
(2240)
1145

7312
(1727)
1910

Panel B. Averaged ATE of Working in STEM (11 vs. 10)
ATE
N

6480
(2903)
424

2612
(1850)
1211

Panel C. Averaged ATE of Majoring&Working in STEM (11 vs. 00)
ATE
N

13651
(2601)
1145

9925
(1401)
1910

Note: This predicted values come from 1000,000 replications: 1000 bootstraps each with 1000
replications. Panel A shows the averaged ATE of majoring in STEM; Panel B shows the averaged
ATE of working in STEM; Panel C shows the averaged ATE of majoring and working in STEM.
Column (1) and (2) separately show predicted values for female and male. Standard deviations are
in parentheses.
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Table 1.15.: Counterfactuals of Majoring in STEM
(1)
Female
Proportion of STEM Graduates by Gender
Factual:

0.3704
(0.0143)

Counterfactual: replacing αM,A , αM,B

0.3749
(0.0143)

Counterfactual: replacing θA , θB

0.3958
(0.0145)

Counterfactual: replacing αM,A , αM,B ,θA ,θB

0.4037
(0.0145)

Counterfactual: replacing βM

0.4253***
(0.0146)

Counterfactual: replacing XM

0.5763***
(0.0146)

Counterfactual: replacing βM and XM

0.6450***
(0.0141)
1145

N

(2)
Male

0.6354

1910

Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: This predicted values come from 1000,000 replications: 1000 bootstraps each with 1000
replications. Column (1) shows female predicted probability of majoring in STEM (factual) and
counterfactuals. Column (2) shows male predicted probability of majoring in STEM (factual).
Row 2–5 show the probability of majoring in STEM when replacing female parameters with the
corresponding male parameters. Signiﬁcant level of the test—H0 = H1 where H0 = f emale −
f actual; H1 = f emale − counterf actual—are shown as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.16.: Counterfactuals of Working in STEM
(1)
(2)
Female
Male
Proportion of STEM Workers in STEM Graduates by Gender
Factual:

0.7005
(0.0222)

Counterfactual: replacing αJ,A , αJ,B

0.6926
(0.0224)

Counterfactual: replacing θA , θB

0.7057
(0.0221)

Counterfactual: replacing αJ,A , αJ,B , θA , θB

0.6958
(0.0223)

Counterfactuals: replacing βJ

0.7512*
(0.0210)

N

424

0.8020
(0.0398)

1211

Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: This predicted values come from 1000,000 replications: 1000 bootstraps each with 1000
replications. Column (1) shows female predicted probability of working in STEM (factual) and
counterfactuals. Column (2) shows male predicted probability of majoring in STEM (factual).
Row 2–5 show the probability of working in STEM when replacing female parameters with the
corresponding male parameters. Signiﬁcant level of the test—H0 = H1 where H0 = f emale −
f actual; H1 = f emale − counterf actual—are shown as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.17.: Decomposition of Job Decision
(1)
Exclude
Fraction of Graduates in STEM Job

(2)
Replace with Male’s

Factual:

0.7005
(0.0222)

Counterfactual: β#Purdue Graduates in the Same Major

0.4894
(0.0243)

0.6440
(0.0233)

0.8152***
(0.0188)

0.6951
(0.0224)

Counterfactual: βHome State STEM Demand

0.7330
(0.0215)

0.7047
(0.0222)

Counterfactuals: Year Fixed Eﬀects

0.7492
(0.0210)

0.7473
(0.0211)

Counterfactuals: Home Region Fixed Eﬀects

0.7671**
(0.0205)
424

0.8209***
(0.0186)
424

Counterfactual: β#Purdue Female Graduates in the Same Major

N

Note: The sample includes undergraduate cohorts graduated from 2005–2014. Column (1) shows
the counterfactual fraction of female STEM graduates working in STEM for excluding the corresponding predictor. Column (2) shows the counterfactuals of replacing female’s coeﬃcient of
interest with male’s. Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant level of the test—H0 = f actual;
H1 = counterf actual—are shown as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

50

Table 1.18.: Fraction of STEM Graduates being Home or Away

Panel A. Males
Away

Home
N
Panel B. Females
Away

Home
N

(1)
non-STEM

(2)
STEM

133
(18.44%)

587
(81.56%)

95
(19.35%)
228

396
(80.65%)
983

71
(24.4%)

220
(75.6%)

43
(32.3%)
114

90
(67.7%)
310

Note: Panel A and B separately show summary statistics for males and females. Column (1) shows
the number (fraction in parenthesis) of STEM graduates who work in a non-STEM job. Column (2)
shows the number (fraction in parenthesis) of STEM graduates who work in a STEM job. “Home”
means working in a state where one’s home located (reported at college entrance); “Away” means
working in another state.
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Figure 1.1.: Distributions of Female’s Two Abilities
Distributions are centered at mean zero. sd(f 1) = 3.576; sd(f 2) = 2.801

52

Figure 1.2.: Distributions of Male’s Two Abilities
Distributions are centered at mean zero. sd(f 1) = 3.539; sd(f 2) = 2.862
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Figure 1.3.: Distribution of Male Factor 1 by Group
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Figure 1.4.: Distribution of Male Factor 2 by Group

55

Figure 1.5.: Distribution of Female Factor 1 by Group
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Figure 1.6.: Distribution of Female Factor 2 by Group
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Figure 1.7.: Fit of the Model, Male Test Scores
Notes: Actual (red, dash) and predicted (blue, line) cumulative distributions plotted of
the following test scores: (a) ACT English (b) Communication 114 grade points (c) ACT
Reading (d) ACT Science (e) exponential high school GPA, and (f) ACT Math. The
predicted values come from simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model.
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Figure 1.8.: Fit of the Model, Female Test Scores
Notes: Actual (red, dash) and predicted (blue, line) cumulative distributions plotted of
the following test scores: (a) ACT English (b) Communication 114 grade points (c) ACT
Reading (d) ACT Science (e) exponential high school GPA, and (f) ACT Math. The
predicted values come from simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model.
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Figure 1.9.: ATE of Majoring in STEM, on General Intelligence
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Figure 1.10.: ATE of Majoring in STEM, on Mathematical Ability
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Figure 1.11.: MTE of Majoring in STEM, on General Intelligence

62

Figure 1.12.: MTE of Majoring in STEM, on Mathematical Ability
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Figure 1.13.: ATE of Working in STEM, on General Intelligence

64

Figure 1.14.: ATE of Working in STEM, on Mathematical Ability
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Figure 1.15.: MTE of Working in STEM, on General Intelligence
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Figure 1.16.: MTE of Working in STEM, on Mathematical Ability
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Figure 1.17.: ATE of Majoring and Working in STEM, on General Intelligence
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Figure 1.18.: ATE of Majoring and Working in STEM, on Mathematical Ability
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Figure 1.19.: Poor-Sorted High-Ability Women
Note: Overlap the simulated Female00 and Male00 distributions‘
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Figure 1.20.: Career Mapping Visualization System
Note: This is a career mapping visualization system developed by Purdue University to show the
quantitative and verbal score distributions of each Purdue major and that of each occupation of
Purdue graduates.
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2. FERTILITY EXPECTATIONS AND EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE MOTHERS OF
CHINA’S SIBLING-LESS GENERATION
2.1

Introduction
In the late 20th century, women’s educational attainment increased remarkably

relative to men’s in China. Figure 2.1 shows that the gender gap in years of schooling
started narrowing down among cohorts born in 1960, and fully closed within 20 years.
I exploit China’s One-Child Policy (OCP), a population planning policy enforced
between 1979–2015, as an exogenous negative shock to fertility to estimate the causal
eﬀect of birth control policy on educational attainment of the mothers of the siblingless generation, the generation born after the OCP.
Why should we expect mothers of the sibling-less generation to have increased
their human capital investment in response to the birth control policy? It is well
documented that changes in women’s educational attainment are correlated with
trends in fertility and marriage. Women who become mothers at an early age tend to
have accumulated fewer years of schooling compared to those who delay their entry
to motherhood (Waite & Moore, 1978). Goldin (2006) argues that “marriage delay
enabled women to take formal education more seriously and led to changes in their
relationship to work.” There is also a large literature that examines the eﬀect of
fertility and childbearing on women’s labor market attachment and human capital
investments (Waldfogel, 1997; Budig & England, 2001; Goldin & Katz, 2002; Bailey,
2006; Buckles, 2008). Upon observing the OCP implementation, Chinese women
would expect their future childbearing responsibility to be exogenously reduced. Their
expected labor force participation and option value for their future career would be
increased, which together lead to an increase in return to schooling. Furthermore,
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women may delay their entry to motherhood or even to marriage considering the
more relaxed timetable for fertility. These forces would lead women to pursue more
education. Thus, this paper asks whether women who observed the OCP before
dropping out of school changed their educational choices, and how?
I use two diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) approaches to identify the impact of the
OCP on mothers of the sibling-less generation. My ﬁrst DD model estimates the differences in educational attainment between the Han (the ethnic majority) women and
the Han men, for both the birth cohorts aﬀected by the policy (the post-policy group)
and the birth cohorts unaﬀected by the policy (the pre-policy group). Unlike women,
men are less likely to change their dropout decisions in response to exogenously negative shock of their future fertility, because the opportunity cost of fatherhood is
much lower than that of motherhood (Budig & England, 2001; Budig, 2014; Adda
et al., 2015). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that men’s dropout decisions at
schooling ages are less likely to be aﬀected by the OCP. I ﬁnd that, compared to Han
men, the OCP signiﬁcantly increased Han women’s years of schooling by 1.28 years,
which explains 53.6% of the 2.38 years increase in educational attainment of women
born between 1950-1980. This estimate might be bias towards zero since Han men’s
educational attainment could also be positively aﬀected by the OCP.
One concern of this approach is that the OCP might overlap with other economic
reforms that might be in favor of women’s educational attainment. Over this same
time period, many developed and developing countries have experienced rapid convergence and even reversal in the gender gap in educational attainment. Potential
reasons for these changes include declining prejudice in educational institutions, improvements in women’s opportunities in the labor market, and changes in women’s
social status (Becker et al., 2010). One may argue that, even if without the OCP,
China would have experienced the same convergence in gender gap. With this concern
in mind, I explore alternative identiﬁcations for the researh question. Since the OCP
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is a national policy announced to the whole country by the end of 1979, geographical
variation in implementation time is not available for the identiﬁcation1 .
I consider a second DD approach that is free of gender-speciﬁc policy impact.
This approach takes advantage of the fact that the OCP restricted Han (the ethnic
majority) to have only one child per family while allowed non-Han to have two or
more children per family. I exploit the diﬀerence in birth quota between Han and nonHan to construct the treated group, Han women, and the untreated group, non-Han
women, by assuming that Han women’s fertility expectation was strongly aﬀected by
the OCP while non-Han women’s was slightly aﬀected. This approach estimates the
diﬀerences in the educational attainment between Han women and non-Han women,
for both the post-policy group and the pre-policy group. I expect the OCP also had a
positive eﬀect on non-Han women’s educational attainment. Therefore, my estimate
should be considered as a lower bound of the OCP’s true eﬀect on Han women’s
educational attainment. I ﬁnd that the OCP signiﬁcantly increased Han women’s
years of schooling by 1.36 years compared to non-Han women. This approach provides
close estimates to the ﬁrst approach and more importantly, suggests that comfounding
eﬀects on gender diﬀerences is not a major concern.
There is an extensive literature on the eﬀects of China’s family planning policies,
including the OCP, on China’s fertility decline (Lavely & Freedman, 1990; McElroy
& Yang, 2000; Wang et al., 2012; H. Li et al., 2005). The OCP’s eﬀects on human
capital accumulation of the children—the sibling-less generation—has been attracting
a lot of attention as well (Angrist et al., 2005; Black et al., 2005; H. Li et al., 2008;
Rosenzweig & Zhang, 2009; Lee, 2012). However, the OCP’s eﬀect on educational attainment of mothers of the sibling-less generation has been overlooked by economists.
The only study that investigates the OCP’s eﬀect on educational attainment of girls
at schooling ages is the paper by Huang et al. (2015 working paper). They adopt
1

The central government announced the OCP by the end of 1979. The local implementations of the
OCP vary by ﬁnes for above-quota births, one-child subsidies, and the provision of contraceptives.
It is unclear when the laws began being enforced at each local level. Literature often takes 1979 as
the unique time of the OCP being implemented nationally (H. Li et al., 2011).
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the ratio of the monetary penalty for one unauthorized birth to the local averaged
household income as a measure of the OCP intensity2 to estimate the policy’s eﬀect
on girls’ high school completion rates. They ﬁnd a 2 percentage points increase in
high school completion among Han girls when the ﬁne rate doubled. Using variation
in monetary penalty across provinces as a measure of the OCP, however, could be
problematic because local governments may set the amount of ﬁnes according to local
ﬁnancial situations and local fertility demand (Zhang, 2017). Furthermore, monetary
penalty is neither the only or the harshest enforcement of the OCP. Losing track of
the other enforcements, like excluding unauthorized children from public education,
discharging parents from social services, compulsory use of abortion and sterilization, etc. (Banister, 1991) may overestimate the increase in women’s educational
attainment in response to the increase in ﬁne rates.
My paper uses a more straightforward measure of the OCP, the policy itself, by
using a policy dummy to estimate its impact on women’s educational attainment. It
captures the whole eﬀect of the OCP on education, and it is easy to interpret the
point estimates in this paper as they link directly to policy implications. I investigate
the diﬀerences of educational attainment among young and old cohorts to rule out
the potential confounding eﬀects from contemporaneous policy changes, such as the
nine-year compulsory schooling law and college reopening. This analysis conﬁrms the
OCP’s positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on women’s education. I ﬁnd there is no gender diﬀerential or ethnicity diﬀerential eﬀects on college entry or college completion,
suggesting that college reopening did not confound the OCP‘s eﬀect on education. I
also ﬁnd that both Han women’s middle school completion rate and their high school
completion rate are signiﬁcantly increased among the young cohorts. I cannot rule
out compulsory schooling law’s eﬀect on the increase in Han women’s middle school
completion; however, the increase in high school completion cannot be attributed to
the compulsory schooling. Literature ﬁnd that there is no positive eﬀect of com2

The same measure has been used in McElroy & Yang (2000).
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pulsory schooling laws on educational attainment beyond the minimum equirement
(Oreopoulos, 2006).
Analysis on the OCP’s eﬀect on women’s post-school outcomes shows that the
OCP led to delayed ﬁrst marriages and motherhood, decreased number of births, and
increased labor force participation for school-aged women. These ﬁndings provide evidence, though not direct, for potential mechanisms through which the OCP increased
women’s educational attainment. This paper contributes to literature addressing the
shrinking educational attainment gap between women and men in China. It also shed
light on literature that examines the eﬀect of fertility and childbearing on women’s
labor market attachment and human capital investments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides some historical background
of the OCP. Then, Section 2.3 describes the study data while Section 2.4 lays out
the estimation strategy. Section 2.5 presents the main empirical results of the OCP’s
eﬀect on educational attainment, and Section 2.6 provides additional results for later
outcomes and discusses possible mechanisms. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes by addressing the policy implications and suggesting direction for future research.

2.2

Historical Background of One-Child Policy
Since China is such a populous country, controlling the population size has been a

fundamental policy since the early 1960s. There are three periods in the history of the
Chinese family planning policies Period 1 (1963–1971): the central government ﬁrst
announced a position advocating “birth planning in urban areas and densely populated rural areas.” Although family planning commissions were established during
Period 1, this early family planning operation was halted by the Cultural Revolution.
Period 2 (1971–1979): A widely spread family planning campaign was successfully
carried out, and Chinese people voluntarily3 delayed marriage, lengthened the period
during ﬁrst and second birth, and had fewer children. Period 3 (1979–2015): The
3

The campaign was technically voluntary, but it had some coercive elements, although they were
signiﬁcantly less coercive than the One-Child Policy (Zhang, 2017).
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One-Child Policy was formally conceived in 1979 and rapidly established across the
country in 1980 (Banister, 1991; H. Li et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2012; Huang et al.,
2015 working paper). This paper identiﬁes 1980 as the OCP implementation year for
the whole country.
The OCP was the strictest family planning policy as it restricted each couple to
having only one child, but this strict requirement only applied to the Han, the ethnic
majority4 . The policy allowed many exceptions for ethnic minorities5 . An urban nonHan couple could have two children, and a rural non-Han couple could have three,
or even more, children depending on the population size of the ethnic group (Wang
et al., 2012). There are also some exceptions for rural Han couples, considering that
most rural families make a living through labor-intensive agricultural activities. For
example, a rural Han couple could apply for a permit to have a second child four
years after their ﬁrst birth if the only child is female or disabled. Thus, the intensity
of the OCP could be roughly ordered from high to low from urban Han, rural Han,
urban non-Han, and rural non-Han.
The provincial governments gradually issued detailed regulations to guarantee the
enforcement. Population and Family Planning Commissions were set up at every level
(province, city, county, etc.) to ensure the enforcement of the policy. The OCP was
enforced through monetary penalties on above-quota birth, denial of public service,
required abortion of subsequent pregnancy, sterilization etc. (Banister, 1991; McElroy
& Yang, 2000; H. Li & Zhang, 2007). The government also encouraged people to
comply with the policy by rewarding couples who had only one child with a “one child
certiﬁcate,” which entitled them to a variety of beneﬁts (Arnold & Zhaoxiang, 1986).
Meanwhile, the local governments tightened the hukou registration and inspection
and raised awareness of the policy with campaigns and posters.
Note that this paper does not intend to capture the total eﬀect of Chinese family
planning policies on women’s education. As mentioned above, there are several stages
4

The 1982 Census of China indicated that 93.3% of Chinese were Hans.
There is only one ethnic majority in China, Han. The other 55 ethnic groups count as minorities,
non-Han
5
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of the policies representing diﬀerent levels of birth control restrictions before the OCP.
Those policies likely already have eﬀects on women’s education. I only study the
OCP’s eﬀect, which can be interpreted as the extra eﬀect that the OCP added to the
previous policy.

2.3

Data
The micro-data used for the analysis come from the ongoing CFPS6 ), a nationally

representative, annual longitudinal survey of Chinese communities, families, and individuals. The CFPS is designed to collect individual-, family-, and community-level
longitudinal data in contemporary China, which reﬂect the social and economic transformation of Chinese society and how that aﬀects the economic activities, education
outcomes, family relationships, migration, and health status of China’s population.
All members over age nine in a sampled household are interviewed. This study uses
the cross-sectional CFPS 2010 baseline survey in its analysis. In the 2010 baseline
survey, the CFPS successfully interviewed around 15,000 families and about 30,000
individuals within these families, with an approximate response rate of 79%.
The data contain a rich set of individual, household, and community information, including demographic, economic, and educational information. The survey
covers most of the administrative regions7 in China: all four municipalities8 and 21
provinces9 . The darker shaded regions in Figure 2.2 are the provinces and municipalities in which the survey has been conducted. Note that the ones left out10 except
the Hainan province (the island in the south), are very distinct from the others in
terms of ethnic composition, language, and lifestyles; therefore, it would be hard to
compare the policy’s eﬀect in these regions anyways, had the survey covered them.
6

CFPS was launched in 2010 by the Institute of Social Science Survey (ISSS) of Peking University,
China. It is funded by the Chinese government through Peking University.
7
There are four municipalities, 28 provinces (including ﬁve autonomous regions) and two special
administrative regions (Hongkong and Mocau) in China.
8
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing.
9
Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, and Gansu.
10
Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia
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The sample used in the estimation includes cohorts born between 1950 and 1980.
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics of the sample. Women account for 52.12 percent of the population and Han account for 91.89 percent of the population. 83.83
percent of the population is rural. The primary variable used to represent educational
attainment is years of schooling, constructed by the CFPS. It ranges from 0 to 22.
All individuals in this analysis have completed their schooling.
On average, cohorts born between 1950-1980 have completed 7.37 years of schooling. Men have more years of schooling than women, and Han have more years of
schooling compared to non-Han. Figure 2.3 shows most dropouts happen after completing junior high school (9th years schooling). Figure 2.1 shows the increasing trend
of years of schooling across cohorts by gender. The graph shows women’s average
years of schooling has been catching up with men’s among the younger cohorts. The
gender gap among the 1980 cohorts has narrowed compared to the older cohorts.11
There are many beneﬁts to using these survey data. First, they provide detailed information on family background that is essential to one’s education outcome,
namely, number of siblings, both parents’ level of education and both parents’ political status12 . Second, the survey provides birth province, which helps to rule out
the potential problem of inter-province migration. Third, the survey is nationally
representative.

2.4

Method
This section introduces the empirical strategy to identify the eﬀect of the OCP at

diﬀerent schooling ages on the educational attainment of women in the treated group.
I use two standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) approaches to do this. Speciﬁcally,
11

There is an obvious downturn between the mid 1960s to the early 1970s. This phenomenon has
been noticed by Hannum (1999).
12
The answers for father/mother’s level of education include: “Illiterate,” “Primary school,” “Junior
high school,” “Senior high school,” “2- or 3-year college,” “4-year college/Bachelor’s degree,” “
Master’s degree,” and “Doctoral degree.” The answers for father/mother’s political status include:
“Member of Communist Party,” “Member of Democratic Party,” “Member of Communist Youth
League,” and “General public”.
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the ﬁrst DD approach compares Han women relative to Han men, and the second one
compares Han women relative to non-Han women.

2.4.1

Pre-Policy and Post-Policy Groups

There are two cohorts compared in this data. The “old generation,” who were old
enough when the policy was implemented that they had already made the decision
between dropping-out of school and staying in school when the policy came into
play. Thus, the policy should not have aﬀected their educational outcome. This
“old generation” is the pre-policy group. The “young generation was still in school
when the policy was implemented. Considering that the policy lowered the expected
fertility, the lifetime childcare cost was contemporaneously reduced. Therefore, they
could be expected to devote more time to their own education and career in the
future. Thus, the “young generation” is the post-policy group.
My sample includes cohorts born between 1950-1980. I deﬁne the 1950-1959 birth
cohorts (age 21-30 when the policy was implemented) as my pre-policy group because people older than 20 may have already made dropout decisions or most likely
ﬁnished schooling. Including even older cohorts may overestimate the policy’s eﬀect
by attributing the contribution of domestic and international social and economic development to the overall education improvement. The 1960-1980 birth cohorts (age
0-20 when the policy was implemented) are deﬁned as the post-policy cohorts for
the main speciﬁcation. Although this cut-oﬀ age is rather arbitrarily chosen, I do
change the pre- and post-policy group by narrowing the post-policy group to contain
younger cohorts while ﬁxing the pre-policy group, as robustness checks in my subsequent speciﬁcations. I also conduct dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis to show
the policy’s eﬀect on each birth cohort. Figure 2.3 shows that age 12 was the earliest
dropout age, age 15 is the next early dropout age, and most of people drop-out before
entering college13 .
13

Generally speaking, a normal Chinese primary school takes six years to ﬁnish, a junior high school
and a senior high school each takes three years. Students usually start school at age six.
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2.4.2

Han Women VS. Han Men

The ﬁrst approach uses men as the control. Compared to women, men are much
less likely to change their education decisions due to changes in the expected fertility
of their future partners. The opportunity cost of motherhood is also much higher
than that of fatherhood (Budig & England, 2001; Budig, 2014; Adda et al., 2015),
because it is women who give birth, take of maternity leave, and bear most of the
lifelong childcare burden. In this sense, men are appropriate controls for women. The
regression can be written as follows:

Eduisc = α +

C
X

γj Ij + λW omenisc + ηP ostsc + β1 W omenisc × P ostsc + ΩXisc + isc

j=1

(2.1)
where i indexes individuals, s indexes provinces, and c indexes birth cohorts. The
dependent variable Edu is the years of schooling. Ij is a set of birth cohort dummies,
W omen is a dummy for Han women (relative to Han men), P ost is the dummy for
the post policy group, W omen × P ost is a interaction of Han women and post-policy
cohorts. X is a vector of observable characteristics.  is the error term.
The set of demographic characteristics Xisc includes a dummy indicating rural
residence, a women × rural interaction term, province ﬁxed eﬀects, parents’ educational attainment, number of siblings, and parents’ political status. Controlling
for rural factors is important to the estimation, because around 84% of the population were rural residents in the 1960s. Education outcomes of rural residents are
signiﬁcantly lower than their urban counterparts. Also, the traditions of having a big
family and son preference have been more deep-rooted in rural areas relative to urban
areas. Thus, the policy’s eﬀect on rural women could be diﬀerent compared to urban
women. Additionally, number of siblings reﬂects one’s educational resources. Women
and men may face diﬀerent education opportunities based on the number of siblings
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in their household, again because of son preferences in some areas. Controlling for
parents’ education might further control for the gender bias. Lastly, based on China’s
political environment, being a Communist Party member means having responsibility
for insuring the policy’s implementation. Therefore, if parents are members of the
Communist Party, girls are more likely to be well informed of the OCP.
Regression (1) is run on a sample including only Han people. The interpretation
of regression (1) is straightforward. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term, β1 , is
the coeﬃcient of interest, capturing all variation in education speciﬁc to Han women
(relative to Han men) who were younger than a certain cut-oﬀ age when the policy
was implemented. The vector γj is the set of the cohort ﬁxed eﬀects that represent the
policy’s nationwide eﬀects on birth cohorts. λ is the time-invariant gap between Han
women and Han men. One thing worth to note is that β1 may be bias towards zero.
With fewer children in the future, men’s expected ﬁnancial support from children
will decrease. We shouldn’t overlook this channel, considering men were the primary
providers of the families during this time. Thus, men’s educational attainment could
be positively aﬀected by the implementation of the OCP, and my estimate might be
biased towards zero. The estimate should be the lower bound of the true eﬀect.
Considering that there might be some contemporaneous factors that inﬂuenced
the education of post-policy men and women diﬀerently—which violates the parallel
trend assumption of the DD method—I take another approach to estimate the OCP’s
eﬀect on women’s education.

2.4.3

Han Women VS. non-Han Women

The second DD approach is free of gender-speciﬁc policy impact. As discussed
above, the “one child” quota constraint is only against Han couples. Non-Han couples
had more relaxed family planning restrictions compared to Han. An urban non-Han
couple could have two children, and a rural non-Han couple could have three or even
more children depending on population size of that ethnic group. For some minority
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groups with a small population size, the OCP was further relaxed (Wang et al.,
2012). The identiﬁcation is straightforward: Han women’s fertility expectation was
largely reduced while non-Han women’s fertility expectation was slightly reduced by
the OCP. Thus this approach estimates the diﬀerences in the educational attainment
between Han women and non-Han women, for both the post-policy group and the
pre-policy group. In other words, I estimate the diﬀerence of OCP’s eﬀects between
Han women and non-Han women. I expect the OCP also had a positive eﬀect on
non-Han women’s educational attainment because it restricted non-Han’s fertility to
some extent. Therefore, the estimate should show a lower bound of OCP’s true eﬀect
on Han women’s educational attainment. Note that this study does not distinguish
among minority groups and only compares Han to non-Han.
Regression for this DD approach can be written as regression (2). The notations
are the same as in regression (1). Here, β2 is the coeﬃcient of interest, which indicates
the educational improvements in the post-policy Han women relative to non-Han
women. I run the following regression on a sample of only women.

Eduisc = α +

C
X

γj Ij + λHanisc + ηP ostsc + β2 Hanisc × P ostsc + ΩXisc + isc

j=1

(2.2)

2.4.4

Why Not Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences?

One may suggest an alternative approach, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
(triple diﬀerences) identiﬁcation, by taking the diﬀerence between the diﬀerence between Han women and non-Han women and the diﬀerence between Han men and
non-Han men. This approach would compare gender diﬀerences in schooling between
Han and non-Han for cohorts that were diﬀerentially aﬀected by the OCP. Unfortunately, non-Han men’s educational attainment is distinctly diﬀerent from the other
three groups. Figure 2.4 shows that Han men, Han women and non-Han women all
have a clear pattern of trending up, although the line of non-Han women is more
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scattered due to a much smaller sample size. There is no clear pattern for the educational attainment of non-Han men and no particular change compared the pre
and post policy cohorts. Thus, applying a triple diﬀerences approach would clearly
violate parallel trend assumption.

2.5

OCP’s Eﬀect on Educational Attainment

2.5.1

OCP’s Eﬀect on Years of Schooling

Table 2.4 summarizes my ﬁrst set of results, OLS point estimates of β1 in diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of Regression (1). In Column (1), I report the baseline speciﬁcation
including the women dummy, post-policy dummy, interaction of women and postpolicy dummy, rural dummy, interaction of women and rural dummy, birth year ﬁxed
eﬀects, and province ﬁxed eﬀects. Overall, as expected, women had less education,
and rural women had even less. The estimate of interest in column (1) indicates
that Han women obtained 1.269 more years of schooling relative to Han men, when
exposed to the shock of the OCP. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the province-cohort level. The estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level.
For column (2) and later, I add in controls for family characteristics. Column
(2) shows that more siblings in a household leads to less education. Having a father
with senior high school increases Han women’s years of schooling. Having a mother
with senior high school has the opposite eﬀect. These two eﬀects basically oﬀ-set
each other. Having either a father or a mother who is a Communist Party member
increases Han women’s years of schooling. Estimates in column (1)–column(4) are
highly consistent in magnitude and signiﬁcance. After controlling for all the above
family characteristics, the estimate of interest shows the average eﬀect of the OCP on
Han women at schooling ages relative to Han men is an increase in years of schooling
by 1.281 years. This accounts for 53.6% of education improvement of women born
between 1960-1980 relative to women born between 1950-1959.
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The main threat to this approach is that some other potential factors may aﬀect
the post-policy men and women’s educational attainment diﬀerently. For instance,
contemporaneous feminism movements might encourage women to increase their educational attainment. Such potential factors would violate the assumption of the DD
method: diﬀerence between the treated and untreated group is constant in absence of
treatment. With this concern, I take a second approach which avoids gender-speciﬁc
issues.
Table 2.5 presents the results from the second DD approach, which is used to
address concerns related to the ﬁrst approach. Similarly, the estimate in column
(1) is from the baseline speciﬁcation including the Han dummy, policy dummy, the
interaction term of the Han and policy dummies, a rural dummy, a rural and Han
interaction, birth cohort ﬁxed eﬀects, and province ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (1) shows
the OCP increased Han women’s years of schooling by 1.415 years, compared to nonHan women. The estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level. By adding controls
for family characteristics, the point estimate trends down a little. After controlling
for all family characteristics, the average eﬀect of the OCP at schooling ages on
Han women relative to non-Han women is an increase in years of schooling by 1.302
years. Considering that non-Han women might be disproportionately represented
in rural areas and to the extent that women’s opportunities in the labor market
or schooling have increased disproportionately for women in non-rural areas for the
younger cohorts, I include rural by birth cohort ﬁxed eﬀects for the regression in
column (5). The result indicates that the OCP increased Han women’s years of
schooling by 1.364, relative to non-Han women.
Although the comparison between Han women and non-Han women avoids genderspeciﬁc trends, it does not rule out the concern of the diﬀerential trends between
the two ethnic groups. One may argue that some contemporaneous policies might
oﬀer more opportunities to the non-Han, resulting in diﬀerent trends in educational
attainment compared to Han. First, this is quite unlikely during the 1960–1980 time
frame, as most of China’s policies to boost ethnic minority regions happened after
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1980. Second, compared the estimates to the ones from the ﬁrst approach—which is
free of ethnicity speciﬁc policy impact—they are not statistically diﬀerent from each
other. Thus, we should be conﬁdent about the positive eﬀect of the OCP on Han
women’s education. Last, as mentioned earlier, the OCP may positively aﬀect the
non-Han women as well. In this sense, the estimate I provide here is the lower bound
of the OCP’s true eﬀect on Han women.
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the policy’s average eﬀects on all birth cohorts
younger than 20 in 1980. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, the post-policy cohorts are
the ones who were still in school and had not made dropout decisions when the policy
was implemented. The cut-oﬀ age, 20, is rather arbitrarily chosen. Are the policy’s
eﬀects robust across birth cohorts? Which cohorts were impacted the most? Table 2.1
shows how policy’s eﬀects vary across diﬀerent post-policy cohorts. Column (1) to
(9) present results from regression with diﬀerent post-policy groups. The pre-policy
group was ﬁxed to the 1950-1959 birth cohorts, and the post-policy group was changed
by dropping the cohorts in between. For example, the post-policy groups in column
(1)14 are the 1960-1980 birth cohorts and the post-policy groups in column (9) are
cohorts 1968-1980.
In Panel A of Table 2.1, estimates across columns consistently show the positive
eﬀect of the OCP on women’s education. All estimates are strongly signiﬁcant at
1% level. The OCP’s eﬀect trends up for younger cohorts, but not statistically signiﬁcantly. Similarly, Panel B in Table 2.1 shows the same pattern as Panel A. The
dynamic DD results presented in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 illustrate the OCP’s eﬀect
on each birth cohort in another way and mirrors the results in Table 2.1.
To sum up, these estimates show that the OCP had a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on Han women’s years of schooling. By constraining the quota of birth per couple,
the OCP reduced the number of births for women who were exposed to the policy.
Among those women, cohorts at schooling ages saw the opportunity of pursuing higher
education and ended up getting about one more year of schooling on average.
14

The estimates in column (1) are the same as the ones in the last column of Table 2.4 and Table 2.5.
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2.5.2

Compulsory Education and College Reopening

China experienced rapid modernization in the 1980s, together with many policy
changes. This fact raises concerns on the identiﬁcation of the OCP’s eﬀect in this
paper. One speciﬁc policy change that might confound the eﬀects of the OCP is
the nine-year compulsory education law, which took aﬀect on July 1, 1986. The law
established deadlines and requirements in an eﬀort to attain a universal education for
all school aged children. It requires that all children attend school for a minimum of
nine years, equivalent to a junior high school completion. In order to take a closer look
at the OCP’s eﬀect on years of schooling, I run linear probability models replacing
the dependent variables of Equation (2.1) and (2.2) as dummy variables of completion
of n years of schooling (i.e. 1[years of schooling ≥ n]).
Panel A in Table 2.2 shows that a treated Han women increased her likelihood of
completing 8 years of schooling by 7.48 percentage points and completing 9 years of
schooling by 7.38 percentage points. The increase in the probability of ﬁnishing years
of schooling from 10 to 12 is 2.48–2.63 percentage points. This implies that the cohorts
aﬀected by the OCP experienced both higher rate of ﬁnishing junior high school and
senior high school15 . If the gender convergence was only a result from the nine-year
compulsory schooling law, we should only expect column (1)–(2) to be statistically
diﬀerent from zero; and column (3)–(8) to be no diﬀerent than zero16 . But results in
column (3)–(8) clearly show that Han women experienced an increase in high school
completion. The gender convergence in 10 to 12 years of schooling is evident that
the OCP had a positive eﬀect on women’s educational attainment. Results in Panel
B Table 2.2 are consistent with the results in Panel A. The OCP had a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on Han women’s high school completion relative to non-Han women.
If the diﬀerential improvement in education between Han women and non-Han women
15

Junior high school is equivalent to 9 years of schooling; senior high school is equivalent to 12 years
of schooling.
16
Literature on compulsory schooling laws ﬁnd that there is no positive eﬀect of compulsory schooling
law on educational attainment beyond the minimum requirement (Oreopoulos, 2006).
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only came from the nine-year compulsory schooling law, we shouldn’t observe any
eﬀect on years of schooling beyond junior high (estimates shown in column (3)–(8)).
Another policy change might arguably aﬀect women and men diﬀerently in educational attainment is college reopening in late October 1977. In acknowledgment of
more than a decade of missed opportunity due to the cultural revolution, candidates
ranging in age from 13 to 37 were allowed to take the National Entrance Examination
(a.k.a. Gaokao). Let’s assume that college reopening had diﬀerential treatment eﬀect
on each gender or diﬀerential treatment eﬀect on each ethnic group. We should be
able to see signiﬁcant estimates with decent magnitude in column(6)–column(9)17 .
Instead, we don’t observe any increase in Han women’s college enrollment or completion relative to Han men or non-Han women, indicating that college reopening had
no eﬀect on Han women relative to Han men (or non-Han women).
Here, I cannot rule out all possible policy changes that might confound the eﬀect
of the OCP, but only discuss the most acknowledged and inﬂuential ones above. This
analysis implies that the OCP did contribute to women’s education improvement.

2.6

Hypothesized Mechanism
The OCP explains a large portion of education improvement of women born be-

tween 1960–1980 compared to women born between 1950–1959. This section estimates
the policy’s eﬀect on women’s later outcomes after ﬁnishing school and links the later
outcomes to the potential mechanism of increase in educational attainment.
There are several channels that could increase Han women’s educational attainment. The ﬁrst one is through labor force participation (LFP). Anticipating higher
labor force participation due to the exogenous reduction of child-rearing burden,
women would invest more in human capital. Women may also expect less ﬁnancial
support from children, assuming no quantity-quality trade-oﬀ. This strengthens the
LFP channel. The second channel is through timing of marriage and timing of fer17

13–16 years of schooling are equivalent to 1–4 years of college education.
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tility. Anticipating having fewer children, women may delay entry to motherhood
or even delay entry to the ﬁrst marriage (Buckles, 2008). Ideally, I would examine
the OCP’s eﬀect on changes of women’s expectation on career, marriage and fertility.
Unfortunately, there is no measure of expectation on those aspects in any survey
within the same time frame. Instead, I estimate the OCP’s eﬀect on later outcomes
such as age at ﬁrst marriage, age at ﬁrst birth, and labor force participation. If the
channel of the OCP aﬀecting women’s educational attainment is through changes in
expectation of these later outcomes, we should be able to observe the changes in later
outcomes reacting to the OCP.
Panel A in Table 2.6 presents the gender diﬀerences within Han. Assuming that
men were much less impacted by the OCP due to their small share of child-bearing
burden, we should expect Han men had little change in labor force participation
(LFP). Column (1) shows that relative to Han men, the OCP signiﬁcantly increased
Han women’s likelihood of having a formal job by 8.4 percentage points. We shouldn’t
assume that men’s LFP was not aﬀected by the OCP. But if men’s labor force participation could be aﬀected by a decline in expected ﬁnancial support from children,
we should expect an increase in men’s LFP as well. In that case, the estimate here is
the lower bound. However, column (1) in Panel B shows that the diﬀerence between
Han women and non-Han women’s LFP do not diﬀer before and after the OCP. This
means LFP is not the main channel that diﬀerentially aﬀects Han women and nonHan women’s investment in education. Column (2) in Panel B shows that Han women
and non-Han women are not diﬀerent in marriage entry either. In contrast, under the
OCP, Han women delay their entry into ﬁrst marriage by 0.6 years compared to Han
men. This supports the hypothesis of delayed entry into ﬁrst marriage. Results in
Column (3)—both Panel A and Panel B—stand out: Han women signiﬁcantly delay
their entry to motherhood, providing evidence that delaying entry to motherhood is
a channel of increasing education investment. Speciﬁcally, Han women’s age at the
ﬁrst birth increased by 0.46 compared to Han men and increased by 0.9s compared
to non-Han women. I want to point out that Column (2) and Column (3) in Panel A
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are not statistically diﬀerent, which makes sense. Because Han women and Han men
would be identically aﬀected when further delay their entry to the ﬁrst birth after
marriage. Compared to non-Han women, Han women delay their entry to the ﬁrst
birth by 0.9 year. This implies the delay in entry to motherhood primarily explains
the Han and non-Han gap.
Analysis in this section presents labor force participation, marriage, and fertility
consequences caused by the OCP. More importantly, it supports the hypothesized
mechanism that women increased their education due to the increase in labor force
participation, delayed entry to marriage, and delayed entry to motherhood.

2.7

Conclusion
Women’s educational attainment has been increasing tremendously compared to

men’s all over the world. This paper exploits China’s One-Child Policy, as an exogenous shock to fertility to estimate its eﬀect on educational attainment of the women
who are the mothers of the sibling-less generation. Expected fertility was reduced by
the OCP for women at schooling ages. Then the reduced expected fertility increased
women’s return to schooling, which led to higher educational attainment. This study
uses two diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approaches to estimate this eﬀect. The ﬁrst DD
uses men as the untreated group because men are much less likely to change their
educational decision due to the changes in the expected fertility of their partners.
The second DD uses non-Han women as the untreated group. As non-Han women
have much more relaxed OCP restrictions compared to Han in terms of birth quota,
non-Han women’s expected fertility was less reduced due to the policy.
I ﬁnd that the OCP signiﬁcantly increased Han women’s years of schooling by
1.281 years relative to Han men, which explains 53.6% of the increase in women’s
educational attainment in birth cohorts between 1950–1980. By investigating the
OCP’s eﬀect on each level of schooling, I rule out the arguable confound eﬀects of
the nine-year compulsory schooling law and the college reopening policy, which both
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also happened in the 1980s. By analyzing post-school outcomes, I provide evidence
of the OCP’s eﬀect on women’s delayed entry to ﬁrst marriage and motherhood and
increased labor force participation, which helps explain the mechanism of the OCP’s
eﬀect on educational attainment.
This paper exploits China’s OCP to explain the shrinking education gap between
women and men, highlighted in the literature on links between fertility and human
capital accumulation. More generally, it contributes to the literature on women’s
empowerment all over the world. Last, but not least, it ﬁlls in a gap of underexplored
issues in the rich literature of China’s Family Planning Policies.

1.281***
(0.153)

1.319***
(0.154)

1.359***
(0.154)

1.364***
(0.357)
10593

1.329***
(0.358)
10339

1.345***
(0.362)
10137

1.348***
(0.366)
9693

1.371***
(0.368)
9191

1.458***
(0.155)

1.421***
(0.373)
8758

1.513***
(0.156)

1.509***
(0.379)
8371

1.498***
(0.156)

1.497***
(0.386)
7954

1.488***
(0.159)

1.540***
(0.393)
7587

1.520***
(0.161)

(9)
Age ≤ 12

Note: Data is from CFPS. The sample includes Han cohorts from 1950-1980. The dependent variable is years of schooling. Independent variables
include women dummy, interaction of women and post-policy dummy, birth year ﬁxed eﬀects, and province ﬁxed eﬀects. Again, there is no
post-policy dummy in the regression, because it would be perfectly collinear with the birth cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. Interaction of women and policy
dummy equals one for Han women born between 1960-1980, and equals zero for everyone else. Other controls include rural dummy, interaction
term of rural and women dummy, number of siblings, dummy of father completing high school, dummy of mother completing high school, dummy
of father being a communist party member and dummy of mother being a communist party member. Each column presents results from a
regression with a diﬀerent speciﬁcation.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province-cohort level.

N

Han × P olicy

Panel B. Han Women VS. non-Han Women

W omen × P olicy
1.435***
(0.153)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Age ≤ 20 Age ≤ 19 Age ≤ 18 Age ≤ 17 Age ≤ 16 Age ≤ 15 Age ≤ 14 Age ≤ 13

Panel A. Han Women VS. Han Men

Treated Cohorts

Table 2.1.: OCP’s Eﬀects on Each Bunching of Cohort
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(2)
Edu ≥ 9

0.0748***
(0.0160)
18692

0.0738***
(0.0158)
18692

0.0263**
(0.0131)
18692

0.0979***
(0.0323)
10593

0.0945***
(0.0324)
10593

0.0467*
(0.0249)
10593

0.0438*
(0.0248)
10593

0.0470*
(0.0244)
10593

0.0248**
(0.0127)
18692

0.0165
(0.0105)
10593

-0.000183
(0.00649)
18692

0.0153
(0.0104)
10593

-0.000354
(0.00642)
18692

0.0165
(0.0105)
10593

-0.000175
(0.00643)
18692

0.00637
(0.00826)
10593

-0.00631
(0.00371)
18692

Note: Data is from CFPS. The sample includes Han cohorts from 1950-1980. The dependent variable is years of schooling. Independent variables
include women dummy, interaction of women and post-policy dummy, birth year ﬁxed eﬀects, and province ﬁxed eﬀects. Again, there is no
post-policy dummy in the regression, because it would be perfectly collinear with the birth cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. Interaction of women and policy
dummy equals one for Han women born between 1960-1980, and equals zero for everyone else. Other controls include rural dummy, interaction
term of rural and women dummy, number of siblings, dummy of father completing high school, dummy of mother completing high school, dummy
of father being a communist party member and dummy of mother being a communist party member. Each column presents results from a
regression with a diﬀerent speciﬁcation.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province-cohort level.

N

Han × P olicy

0.0253**
(0.0129)
18692

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Edu ≥ 10 Edu ≥ 11 Edu ≥ 12 Edu ≥ 13 Edu ≥ 14 Edu ≥ 15 Edu ≥ 16

Panel B. Han Women VS. non-Han Women

N

W omen × P olicy

Panel A. Han Women VS. Han Men

(1)
Edu ≥ 8

Table 2.2.: OCP’s Eﬀect on Each Level of Schooling
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Table 2.3.: Descriptive Statistics of CFPS, by Demographic Groups
Variable

Observations
Education
Year of Schooling
≥Junior High Completed
≥Senior High Completed
≥4-yr College Completed

Han

non-Han

All

Men

Women

Men

Women

8597

9334

747

836

8.156 (4.081)
62.04% (0.485)
25.11%(0.434)
2.90%(0.168)

6.331 (4.683)
45.35% (0.498)
17.61%(0.381)
1.80%(0.133)

6.226 (4.628)
42.84% (0.495)
14.59%(0.353)
1.87%(0.136)

3.09(1.908)

3.256(1.939)

3.325(1.842)

3.459(1.856)

3.195(1.921)

19514

4.444 (4.745)
7.373 (4.552)
29.67% (0.457) 51.88%(0.500)
10.52%(0.307) 20.47%(0.403)
1.675%(0.128) 2.28%(0.149)

Family
# of Siblings
Father’s Edu
≥Junior high school
Mother’s Edu
≥Junior high school
Father: Member of Communist
Mother: Member of Communist
Rural

32.5%(0.469)

34.52%(0.475)

32.13%(0.467)

33.97%(0.474)

33.53%(0.472)

18.06%(0.385)
0.169(0.375)
0.022(0.147)
0.827(0.378)

18.63%(0.389)
0.174(0.379)
0.025(0.157)
0.834(0.372)

17.40%(0.379)
0.146(0.353)
0.030(0.170)
0.923(0.266)

20.45%(0.404)
0.141(0.349)
0.014(0.119)
0.921(0.270)

18.42%(0.388)
0.169(0.375)
0.024(0.152)
0.838(0.368)

Later Outcome
Labor Force Participation
# of Birth
Age at First Marriage
Age at First Birth

0.682(0.466)
1.688(0.919)
1988.8(8.582)
1990.5(8.214)

0.511(0.500)
1.810(0.908)
1987.4(8.470)
1989.2(8.196)

0.707(0.456)
1.963(1.037)
1989.6(8.853)
1991.6(8.206)

0.590(0.492)
2.138(1.000)
1988.7(9.062)
1990.9(8.301)

0.600 (0.490)
1.776(0.927)
1988.1(8.593)
1989.9(8.242)

Notes: Data is from CFPS. Sample includes cohorts born between 1950-1980.
Standard deviations are in the parentheses.
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Table 2.4.: Han Women v.s. Han Men
Dependent Var.

Years of Schooling
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

W omen × P olicy

1.269***
(0.153)

1.277***
(0.153)

1.287***
(0.153)

1.281***
(0.153)

W omen

-1.055***
(0.152)

-1.047***
(0.152)

-1.059***
(0.152)

-1.068***
(0.153)

P olicy

4.330***
(0.250)

4.094***
(0.254)

4.083***
(0.258)

4.035***
(0.259)

Rural

-2.927***
(0.107)

-2.854***
(0.107)

-2.857***
(0.108)

-2.719***
(0.110)

W omen × Rural

-1.969***
(0.133)

-1.964***
(0.133)

-1.964***
(0.133)

-1.954***
(0.133)

-0.110***
(0.0171)

-0.113***
(0.0171)

-0.113***
(0.0168)

F atherSeniorHigh

0.346***
(0.0814)

0.353***
(0.0803)

M otherSeniorHigh

-0.490***
(0.0963)

-0.421***
(0.0956)

#Siblings

F atherCommunist

0.844***
(0.0767)

M otherCommunist

1.307***
(0.201)

Constant

State FE
Birth Year FE
Number of Siblings
Father/Mother Edu ≥ Senior High
Father/Mother Being Communist
N

9.626***
(0.263)

9.829***
(0.264)

9.843***
(0.260)

9.460***
(0.259)

YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
18692

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
18692

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
18692

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
18692

Note: Data is from CFPS. The sample includes Han cohorts from 1950-1980. The dependent variable
is years of schooling. Independent variables include women dummy, policy dummy, interaction of
women and policy dummy, birth year ﬁxed eﬀects, and province ﬁxed eﬀects. Again, there is no
post-policy dummy in the regression, because it would be perfectly collinear with the birth cohort
ﬁxed eﬀects. Interaction of women and policy dummy equals one for Han women born between
1960-1980, and equals zero for everyone else. Other controls include rural dummy, interaction term
of rural and women dummy, number of siblings, dummy of father completing high school, dummy
of mother completing high school, dummy of father being a communist party member and dummy
of mother being a communist party member. Each column presents results from a regression with
a diﬀerent speciﬁcation.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province-cohort level.
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Table 2.5.: Han Women v.s. nonHan Women
Dependent Var.

Years of Schooling
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.415***
(0.358)

1.297***
(0.355)

1.294***
(0.356)

1.302***
(0.353)

1.364***
(0.357)

-0.856
(0.526)

-0.756
(0.528)

-0.765
(0.531)

-0.847
(0.516)

-0.963*
(0.515)

P olicy

4.542***
(0.466)

4.406***
(0.465)

4.408***
(0.468)

4.403***
(0.471)

3.535***
(1.029)

Rural

-5.401***
(0.479)

-5.270***
(0.480)

-5.272*** -5.161***
(0.485)
(0.474)

-5.225***
(0.889)

0.804*
(0.482)

0.770
(0.482)

0.761
(0.487)

0.811*
(0.477)

0.900*
(0.473)

-0.136***
(0.0246)

-0.140***
(0.0245)

-0.140***
(0.0244)

-0.143***
(0.0246)

F atherSeniorHigh

0.339***
(0.102)

0.338***
(0.101)

0.334***
(0.101)

M otherSeniorHigh

-0.581***
(0.127)

-0.489***
(0.126)

-0.487***
(0.127)

F atherCommunist

0.950***
(0.106)

0.953***
(0.106)

M otherCommunist

1.421***
(0.272)

1.463***
(0.271)

Han × P olicy

Han

Han × Rural

#Siblings

Constant

State FE
Birth Year FE
Number of Siblings
Father/Mother Edu ≥ Senior High
Father/Mother Being Communist
Dummy of Rural × Birth Year
N

9.351***
(0.654)

9.505***
(0.647)

9.549***
(0.648)

9.195***
(0.638)

9.261***
(0.938)

YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
10593

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
10593

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
10593

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
10593

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
10593

Note: Data is from CFPS. The sample includes female cohorts from 1950-1980. The dependent
variable is years of schooling. Independent variables include Han dummy, interaction of Han and
post-policy, birth year ﬁxed eﬀects, and province ﬁxed eﬀects. Again, there is no post-policy dummy
in the regression, because it would be perfectly collinear with the birth cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. Interaction of Han and policy dummy equals one for Han women born between 1960-1980, and equals zero
for everyone else. Other controls include rural dummy, interaction term of rural and Han dummy, rural speciﬁc cohort ﬁxed eﬀects, number of siblings, dummy of father completing high school, dummy
of mother completing high school, dummy of father being a communist party member and dummy
of mother being a communist party member. Each column presents results from a regression with
a diﬀerent speciﬁcation.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province-cohort level.
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Table 2.6.: OCP’s Eﬀects on Women’s Post-School Outcomes
Dependent Variable

(1)
(LFP)

(2)
(Age at 1st Marr)

(3)
(Age at 1st Birth)

Panel A. Han Women vs. Han Men
Policy’s Eﬀect
N

0.084***
(0.017)
18687

0.592***
(0.188)
16452

0.456***
(0.143)
17024

Panel B. Han Women vs. non-Han Women
Policy’s Eﬀect
N

0.022
(0.043)
10589

0.033
(0.317)
9290

0.911**
(0.431)
9787

Note: The sample includes birth cohorts from 1950-1980. The dependent variable in column (1)–(3)
are labor force participation (i.e. dummy of whether one has ever had a formal job), and age at
the ﬁrst marriage, and age at the ﬁrst birth. Independent variables include women dummy (Han
dummy in Panel B), policy dummy, interaction of women and policy (interaction of Han and policy
in Panel B), province ﬁxed eﬀects, birth year ﬁxed eﬀects, rural dummy, interaction term of rural
and Han dummy, number of siblings, father and mother’s level of education and father, and mother’s
political status. Policy dummy equals 1 for post-policy cohorts born between 1960-1980, and equals
0 for everyone else.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province-cohort level.
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Figure 2.1.: Averaged Years of Schooling by Gender
Notes: Individual sample weights provided by CFPS were used in the construction of this ﬁgure.
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Figure 2.2.: CFPS Covers 21 Provinces and 4 Municipalities
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Figure 2.3.: Distribution of Highest Level of Education
Notes: The sample includes birth cohorts from 1950-1980
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Figure 2.4.: Averaged Years of Schooling by Gender by Ethnicity
Notes: Individual sample weights provided by CFPS were used in the construction of this ﬁgure.
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Figure 2.5.: Dynamic DD between Han Women & Han Men
Notes: The sample includes birth cohorts from 1950-1980
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Figure 2.6.: Dynamic DD between Han Women & non-Han Women
Notes: The sample includes birth cohorts from 1950-1980
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3. WHEN OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS: CHINA’S OPEN
DOOR POLICY AND DECLINING EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT
3.1

Introduction
There is a growing literature exploring the links between trade and educational

choice. New job opportunities brought by growth in exports shift the relationship
between education and earnings. However, the direction of this change is ambiguous
ex ante. Initial export growth in developing countries typically is driven by low-skill,
labor intensive goods (Amiti & Freund, 2010). This should suggest a decrease in the
returns to education and a decline in educational attainment, as less educated workers
face greater wages and job availability after exposure to export growth. Alternatively,
exports to industrialized, high-income countries have been shown to increase the skill
premium (Brambilla et al., 2012; Pissarides, 1997), suggesting that the returns to
education and educational attainment should increase in response to export growth.
In this study, we examine the initial period of export growth in China following the
Open Door Policy in 1978, investigating how the educational choices of teenagers
changed in response to export exposure.
National trends in Chinese educational attainment suggest that the implementation of the Open Door Policy caused students to leave school and enter the workforce.
Figure 3.1 shows that high school and middle school completion rates decline sharply
for cohorts born in the early 1960s, only reversing in the late 1960s and 1970s. Compared to the cohort born in 1960, the cohort born in 1967 was 60 percent less likely
to ﬁnish high school (16.7 percentage points), and was 16 percent less likely to ﬁnish
middle school (10.2 percentage point). This is surprising, as the 1960s cohorts’ primary and middle school education occurred during the Cultural Revolution. During
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the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), all universities in China were closed; the national college entrance exam was not resumed until October 1977. Cohorts born in
the late 1960s were in primary school at the end of the Cultural Revolution, however.
Given nationwide improvements in education quality and the renewed possibility of
college attendance, we would typically expect educational attainment to be higher
for these younger cohorts than for those born in the early 1960s, but the opposite is
true. It took over a decade for the middle school completion rate to return to its 1960
level and over twenty years for the high school completion rate to return to its 1960
level. Although the sociology literature has brieﬂy mentioned this education trend
(Hannum, 1999), ours is the ﬁrst in economics to explore the causes of this decline
and its long-run implications on Chinese labor markets.
We ﬁnd that exposure to export growth in the late 1970s causes a substantial
decline in high school completion. A $1000 increase in exports per worker in a prefecture1 causes a 4.76 percentage point decline in high school completion from 1960
to 1970. Overall, between-prefecture diﬀerences in exposure to export growth caused
by the Open Door Policy decrease the high school completion rate by 1.7 percentage
point at the mean for cohorts born in the late 1960s. Though this only explains
about 10.4% of the national decline in high school completion for 1960s birth cohorts,
exposure to export growth induces substantial geographical variation in educational
choice.2 In this time period, high school graduates were the primary source of highskilled labor in China, so our results demonstrate a decline in high-skilled labor and a
corresponding increase in low-skilled labor occurred in the most highly trade-exposed
areas of China for those born in the 1960s.
This paper contributes to the literature studying how educational choices are affected by trade ﬂow changes. Atkin (2016) studies the education choices of Mexican
teenagers after Mexican trade liberalization from 1986 to 2000, ﬁnding that the ex1

The mean export exposure per worker in Table 3.1 is $402.
We also ﬁnd no substantial impact on the middle school completion rate; i.e., our results suggest
a rise in dropping out of school after middle school, but not a rise in dropouts before middle school
completion.
2
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pansion of job opportunities in the manufacturing sector leads to students dropping
out at grade 9 instead of continuing through grade 12. The main mechanism we investigate and our ﬁndings are similar to Atkin’s, although the methods we use diﬀer.
Atkin’s main speciﬁcation is an instrumental variables regression, with a large singleﬁrm expansion (e.g. a plant opening) as an instrument for new export-related jobs,
and his independent variable is local cohort-average schooling. Our speciﬁcation is
useful for studies of countries and periods where ﬁrm-level microdata are not available
and provides a measure for export-induced local job openings without relying on the
counts of new openings.
The closest study to our paper is B. Li (2016 working paper). She studies the
eﬀects of export growth on educational attainment in China from 1990 to 2005 and
ﬁnds that high-skill export shocks increase high school and college enrollment while
low-skill export shocks depress both. We look at an older generation than Li because
we aim to explain the puzzling decline in educational attainment in the 1960s, while
Li examines a period of greater trade growth in China.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a historical background of
China’s Open Door Policy reforms in 1978, as well as an overview of major educational policy changes in the 1970s. Section 3.3 describes the data, and Section 3.4
explains the estimation strategies used. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results
of the Open Door Policy’s eﬀects on educational attainment. Finally, Section 3.6
provides concluding remarks.

3.2

Historical Background

3.2.1

The Open-Door Policy

Before 1978, China had a rigid centrally planned economy. Individuals and private corporations were not allowed to trade without intermediation with state-owned
corporations. Domestic commodity prices were not linked to international prices,
and foreign currency exchanges were highly restricted. These policy barrier resulted
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in almost no trade. From the data reported by all trade partners of China in the
UN Commodity Trade database, the total value of all Chinese exports in 1962 was
616,785,000 USD, 1.3% of the national GDP.
In December 1978, China enacted a series of reforms to loosen its trade policy. The
government decentralized decision making regarding exports and imports, granting
local governments and foreign trade corporations decision-making power. Meanwhile,
the government replaced the administrative restrictions on exports and imports with
tariﬀs, quotas, and licensing. Controls on foreign exchange were loosened, particularly for foreign-invested or foreign-managed ﬁrms. The government ﬁrst designated
4 special economic zones (SEZ) in 1980, where foreign and domestic investment decisions could be made without authorization from the central government in Beijing.3
Later, 14 cities spread along the entire Paciﬁc coast were designated “open coastal
cities” for a similar purpose to the original 4 SEZ (Wei, 1995).4
During the same period, China restructured the administration of the agriculture
sector. Under the new household responsibility system, local rural households were
held responsible for the proﬁts and losses of the land assigned to them. It was ﬁrst
adopted in 1979, and expanded nationwide in 1981. Unlike the former agricultural
system, this household responsibility system stimulated farmers’ enthusiasm and substantially increased agricultural productivity (Lin, 1987, 1988).

3.2.2

Educational History

Figure 3.1 shows that educational attainment declined for cohorts born in the
1960s. We aim to link this decline to the implementation of the Open Door Policy,
but this was a tumultuous time period in China with many reforms and shocks that
aﬀected education. Perhaps the most well known of these is the Cultural Revolution.
However, the Cultural Revolution is unlikely to be the cause of declining education
3

The 4 SEZ were Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen.
The “open coastal cities” diﬀered from the SEZ by their well-established industry facilities and
educated labor force.
4
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among the 1960s birth cohorts because it occurred from 1966-1976, long before the
younger cohorts with the lowest educational attainment entered middle school. The
most well-known impact of the Cultural Revolution on education is the closure of all
colleges from 1966 to the early 1970s. The national university entrance exam was
reinstated in 1977. Middle school education and high school education were aﬀected
to a lesser degree as well. The Down to the Countryside Movement started in 1968, by
sending urban middle school and high school graduates to rural areas. The main group
of “sent-down youth” were birth cohorts 1948-1953 (aged 13-18 in 1966). During the
same time period, the government expanded primary schools and middle schools,
especially in rural areas. As a result, according to the Chinese National Statistics
Yearbook 1980, enrollment in primary and middle school increased throughout the
1970s nationwide.

3.3

Data
Our primary data source is the 1990 Chinese Population Census 1% subsample,

providing educational attainment, prefecture and province of residence, migration status and other individual characteristics. We then link the Census with a prefecturelevel export exposure factor. The export exposure factor is a measure for how changes
in exports inﬂuence a prefecture. Export ﬂows are measured as the changes in China’s
total export value for commodities from 1975 to 1982. The commodity export values
come from the United Nations Commodity Trade (UN ComTrade) database, measured in US dollars. We aggregate the import ﬂows from China reported by all
countries and use that as China’s total value of exports. China did not begin reporting its export ﬂows to the United Nations until 1984, despite China exporting goods
for decades before that. We need trade ﬂows from the 1970s to observe changes in
exports from the late 1970s to the 1980s, thus it is not feasible to use export ﬂows
reported by China. Additionally, import ﬂows are generally more reliable than export
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ﬂows because countries have incentives to track import shipments carefully for tariﬀ
purposes (Hummels & Lugovskyy, 2006).
It is commonly believed that export growth in China primarily occurred during
the 1990s and 2000s, especially after China joined the World Trade Organization in
2001. The 1990s and 2000s are when China’s exports became substantial relative to
the rest of the world. However, if we focus on export growth within the country, as
industrialization spread and China’s productivity increased after a series of political
reforms, exports grew exponentially starting in the mid-1970s. According to the
World Bank, the total value of Chinese exports grew ﬁve-fold from 1970 to 1980,
quintupling again from 1980 to 1990. Figure 3.2 shows the changes in export value
for the four highest value industries before 1990 in China. We can see that for the
manufacturing of small goods, clothing, and textiles, export value increased rapidly.
In addition to export changes, we need information on the local labor market
conditions Chinese teens faced in the 1970s, yet poor employment statistics in China
at that time make direct measurement of local labor market conditions impossible.
We instead use the 1982 Chinese Population Census to infer employment by industry
by prefecture in the mid-1970s. We cannot use the whole labor force in 1982 to calculate this directly, as we expect some of the changes in job opportunities brought by
exports have started to appear in the labor market, particularly for younger workers.
We instead used older cohorts, aged 40-50 in the 1982 census (born 1922-1942), to
estimate the employment shares in 1975.
There are concerns that some of these workers may have switched industries between 1975 and 1982. However, given that most workers worked in state-owned
enterprises at that time, the labor market was rigid and moving occupations was not
common. In addition, we choose a cohort that is in a stable stage in their career; they
are less likely to move than their younger, less experienced counterparts. Another
potential concern is workers migrating across regions, so we restrict our sample to
only individuals who have not migrated between prefectures in the last ﬁve years.
We lose less than 5% of the sample from this restriction.
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As shown in table 3.1, prefecutre-leve export exposure per worker from 1975 to
1982 increases in the median prefecture by about $123. The bottom 10% of the
prefectures saw a negative impact. Those are exclusively inland prefectures, mostly
in Tibet. The province-evel export exposure per worker is less disperse. Table 3.2
presents the province-level export exposure per worker by quintiles. The top quintile
includes three municipalities, Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, and two oil producing
provinces, Xinjiang and Liaoning.

3.4

Methods
We aim to estimate the eﬀect of trade on the educational choices of Chinese

students in the 1970s and 1980s, around the implementation of China’s Open Door
Policy in late 1978. To begin, we modify the local labor market exposure measure
used by Autor et al. (2013) to be applicable to the rise in exports in China, rather
than in import competition from a single trading partner:

ΔXP Wck =

X Ljk ΔXwcj
j

Lck

Lk

(3.1)

In equation (3.1), Ljk is the total employment in prefecture k and industry j in
China in 1975, ΔXwcj is the change in Chinese exports to the world (w) in industry
j from 1975 to 1982 (in $1000s). The term ΔXP Wck , then, is the average export
change per worker in prefecture k, weighted by the prefecture’s pre-Open Door Policy
share of total employment nationwide in industry j.
Ideally, we would observe employment by industry and by prefecture in China in
1975, and use this to construct our local export exposure variable. However, these
data are not available, likely due to the political turmoil in China in the mid-1970s.
Instead, we observe employment using China’s 1982 National Population Census, and
restrict our sample to older workers who are unlikely to change industries between
1975 and 1982. Our sample for constructing these labor share variables includes only
workers ages 40 to 50 in 1982 (33 to 43 in 1975), and requires the assumption that
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any movement of these older workers between industries or between prefectures from
1975 to 1982 is not endogenous with the education decisions of teenagers in this time
period. Constructing ΔXP Wck provides us with a single export exposure measure
per prefecture, used as the primary variable of interest in our regressions.
We wish to observe the ﬁnal education decisions of teens who are in school when
China implements its Open Door Policy in 1978; to do this, we use China’s 1990
National Population Census. Treatment is assigned based on prefecture of residence in
1990, restricting our sample to only individuals who have not moved across prefectures
in the past 5 years (> 95% of the sample). Additionally, we exploit heterogeneity
across diﬀerent age groups, as older teens when the Open Door Policy begins are likely
to respond to the trade shock diﬀerently than younger teens. Our primary regression
model is:

Edi = α +

X

βy ΔXP Wck × δy + γXi + εi

(3.2)

y

In (3.2), our coeﬃcients of interest are βy – the diﬀerent eﬀects of the export
exposure ΔXP Wckt on each birth cohort y born between 1960 and 1970, aged 8 to
18 when the Open Door policy begins in 1978. Importantly, the export exposure
does not change between cohorts, it only varies across prefectures. We also include
ﬁxed eﬀects for birth cohort, province, sex, and ethnicity in X. The coeﬃcients βy
identify between-prefecture, within-province, within-birth cohort diﬀerences in the
educational response to a prefecture’s export exposure change. Our outcome variable,
Edi , is a middle school completion dummy variable or a high school completion
dummy variable. In our regressions in Section 3.5, we set birth cohort 1960 as our
baseline, as 18 year olds in 1978 would have already completed middle school and
high school by the time China implemented its’ Open Door policy. This allows us
to make direct comparisons between an unaﬀected cohort (1960), partially aﬀected
cohorts (1961-66)5 , and fully aﬀected cohorts (1967-70).
5

The cohort born in 1966 would be in middle school when the Open Door policy began
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Our paper is closely related to the literature using trade ﬂow changes in the form
of a Bartik instrument (Bartik, 1991) to study labor market responses. Autor, Dorn
and Hanson’s inﬂuential paper used Chinese import ﬂow changes to study the impact
of import competition on labor market outcomes in the United States (Autor et al.,
2013). Our methodology is similar, with one key diﬀerence: ΔXP W is constructed
using changes in aggregate export ﬂows from China to the rest of the world. This
sidesteps the simultaneity issue that Autor, Dorn, and Hanson use IV estimation to
circumvent, as we are interested in Chinese trade with all partners, not with one
particular trading partner. As a result, we estimate equation 3.2 as is, without
implementing a 2SLS framework.

3.5

Results

3.5.1

High School Completion

To begin, we estimate the average eﬀect of prefecture-level export exposure changes
on treated cohorts’ likelihood of completing high school.
Table 3.4 presents the OLS point estimates of the eﬀect of export exposure changes
on high school completion. Column (1) shows the estimate from a naı̈ve regression
including only export exposure, and gender and ethnicity dummies. The estimate
indicates that a $1000 increase in exports per worker increases the likelihood of completing high school by 10.4 percentage points. Adding province ﬁxed eﬀects and birth
year ﬁxed eﬀects, column (2) shows that a $1000 increase in exports per worker increases high school completion by 4.76 percentage points. Both regressions in column
(1) and (2) show a positive correlation between export growth and high school completion in this era in China. However, a more interesting question is how this eﬀect
diﬀers between younger and older students. In other words, does export growth explain that high school completion rates of those born in the late 1960s are signiﬁcantly
lower than those of ones born in 1960.
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Column (3) includes export exposure per worker interacted with birth cohort ﬁxed
eﬀects, in addition to the covariates in column (2). This speciﬁcation identiﬁes how
the eﬀects of export growth diﬀer across birth cohorts. With the 1960 birth cohort set
as the baseline, cohorts born in 1961, 1962, and 1963 experienced increased high school
completion, while the cohorts born after 1964 decreased their high school completion,
relative to the 1960 cohort. Column (4) adds interaction terms of province ﬁxed
eﬀects and birth cohort ﬁxed eﬀects, capturing any potential province-year speciﬁc
eﬀects on education. Column (5) adds prefecture-level controls, including population,
fraction of minority, education level6 before the Open-Door Policy and is our preferred
speciﬁcation. The estimates in column (5) show that the rise in exports has a signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect on cohorts born in and after 1965. Speciﬁcally, compared to the
cohort born in 1960, a $1000 increase in exports per worker leads to a 3.62 percentage
point decrease in the high school completion rate for one born in 1965. Moreover,
this negative eﬀect is greater for younger cohorts. On average, those born in 1970
have a 4.76 percentage point lower probability of completing high school compared
to the 1960 cohort, when experiencing the same trade shock.
It is hard to interpret the eﬀects shown in Table 3.4, since there is substantial
between-prefecture heterogeneity in export growth from 1975 to 1982. The mean
export exposure per worker is $402, but the 25th percentile experienced only $35
of export exposure, the 50th percentile experienced $123, and the 90th percentile
experienced over $650. Figure 3.3 plots the point estimates from Table 3.4, evaluated
at the mean export exposure per worker for each birth cohort, with the 1960 birth
cohort as the baseline. One born in 1966 with a mean export exposure has a 1.7
percentage point lower probability of ﬁnishing high school compared to one born in
1960 with the same exposure. Overall, our relatively coarse export exposure measure
6

Education level is represented by three variables, middle school completion rate, high school completion rate and college completion rate.
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explains 10.4% of the high school completion decline among cohorts born in the
1960s.7
Figure 3.4 includes three curves showing the estimated eﬀects at the 25th, 50th,
and 90th percentile of export exposure per worker. The high school completion rate
for cohorts born between 1964-1970 with the 90th percentile export exposure8 is
reduced by 1.3 to 3 percentage points compared to the 1960 birth cohort.
Overall, the results shown above indicate that China’s Open Door Policy had a
negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the high school completion rates of the 1964-1970
birth cohorts, compared to the cohort born in 1960.

3.5.2

Middle School Completion

The previous results suggest that high schoolers dropped out of school due to job
opportunities brought by the Open Door Policy. It is important to also investigate if
this trade shock had a similar eﬀect on middle school completion. In Figure 3.1, both
middle school and high school completion rates declined for the 1960s birth cohorts,
although the reduction in high school completion rate was greater and aﬀected older
cohorts compared to the decrease in middle school completion. We run the same
regressions as in Table 3.4, with the dependent variable as middle school completion.
Table 3.5 presents OLS point estimates of the eﬀect of export exposure on middle
school completion. Surprisingly, the trade shock has a positive eﬀect on the middle
school completion rate of all the 1960s birth cohorts compared to the baseline cohort
in 1960. The estimates are statistically signiﬁcant for cohorts from 1963 to 1970 in
column (3) and (4), and the eﬀects are stronger for younger cohorts. After controlling
for prefecture level controls, we can still see the positive eﬀects for cohorts 1963 and
7

The high school completion rate decreased from 30.02% in the 1960 birth cohort to 13.67% in the
1966 birth cohort.
8
Jinzhou city, Chaoyang city, Huludao city, Taiyuan city, Anshan city, Dandong city, Tongling city,
Shanghai municipality, Beijing municipality, Tianjin municipality, Dalian city, Huainan city, Qiqihar
city, Suihua city, Daqing city, Liaoyang city, Urumuqi city, Baicheng city, Songyuan city, Yingkou
city, Panjin city, Lanzhou city, Benxi city, Wuhai city, Jiuquan prefecture, Fushun city and Karamay
city.

114
1970. These education variables are cumulative: a high school graduate counts as both
a high school and a middle school completer. Thus these ﬁndings are not explained by
teens dropping out of high school and only completing middle school. This presents
a puzzle – why would export growth increase middle school completion, yet decrease
high school completion for cohorts born in the 1960s?

Farmer Heterogeneity
During the same period as the Open-Door Policy, China experienced a series of
fundamental changes to the agricultural sector, where rural households gained responsibility for the proﬁts and losses of the land assigned to them. These policies
were ﬁrst adopted in 1979, and expanded nationwide in 1981 by Deng Xiaoping. Unlike the previous agricultural system under Mao Zedong, this more privatized system
stimulated farmers’ enthusiasm and increased agricultural productivity. As a result,
labor demand in the agricultural sector increased under this new system. Our export
exposure measure is larger in highly industrialized, non-agrarian prefectures. Given
that export exposure is positively associated with the middle school completion rate
in Table 3.5, it is likely that this eﬀect can be explained by a reduction in middle
school completion in rural provinces, rather than by a positive causal eﬀect of export growth on middle school completion. To investigate this, we construct a farmer
dummy variable and a series of interaction terms of this variable and birth cohort
and include them in the primary regression model.9
Column 1 in Table 3.6 shows the estimates of export exposure’s eﬀect on middle
school completion, accounting for farmer heterogeneity. The coeﬃcients shown are
only for non-farmers; coeﬃcients for farmers are shown in Table D.1 in the appendix.
We can see that after accounting for farmer diﬀerences, the coeﬃcients of interest for
non-farmers become small and insigniﬁcant. Figure 3.5 also plots the point estimates
9

We use the occupation reported in the 1990 Census to identify farmers, as we do not have their
hukou information for their oﬃcial urban/rural designation. Occupation codes we consider farmers
are detailed in the data appendix.
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with conﬁdence intervals from this regression, and Figure 3.6 shows the eﬀects at different percentiles of export exposure per worker on middle school completion. These
results show that the Open Door Policy had no eﬀect on the middle school completion
rates of the 1960s cohorts, and suggest that agricultural reform is the cause of the
decline in primary and middle school completion among these cohorts.
As a robustness check, we add the same set of farmer dummies to the high school
completion regression and show the results in Column 2 of Table 3.6. The eﬀect on
high school completion becomes smaller after controlling for farmer heterogeneity,
but the eﬀects are still signiﬁcant and comparable in magnitude to those in Table 3.4.
In Figure 3.7 we can still see obvious negative eﬀects, although the eﬀects are not
statistically signiﬁcant for several birth cohorts. Compared to Figure 3.4, Figure 3.8
shows that the trade shock’s eﬀect on high school completion is weaker at all levels
of export exposure per worker after accounting for farmer heterogeneity.

3.5.3

Falsiﬁcation Tests

One potential concern with our identiﬁcation is that the local export exposure
per worker could change in conjunction with human capital accumulation so that
this trade shock is not exogenous to education. We test this concern by running the
same regression on older cohorts, born from 1940-1960, who had already ﬁnished their
education when the Open Door Policy started. Figure 3.9 presents the coeﬃcients
of interest of the regression on birth cohorts 1940-1970. Although noisy, the trade
shock’s eﬀect on earlier cohorts (1940-1960) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
and are generally smaller than the primary eﬀects shown from 1964-1970.

3.6

Conclusion
We investigate how China’s Open-Door Policy can explain the decline in educa-

tional attainment among China’s 1960s birth cohorts. There are clear drops in both
high school and middle school completion for nearly a decade, and we are the ﬁrst
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to examine the underlying causes of these nationwide trends. We ﬁnd that export
growth driven by the Open Door Policy decreased high school completion by 4.76
p.p. for the cohorts born in 1970, compared to the baseline cohort born in 1960. This
suggests a tradeoﬀ between education and labor market opportunities in China. The
negative eﬀect of export exposure are more prominent for cohorts who were younger
when China’s Open-Door Policy began, even though these teenagers also faced a
stronger education system compared to the earlier cohorts. We ﬁnd no eﬀect of the
export exposure on middle school completion rates.
This paper is the ﬁrst study that links the educational attainmetn of the 1960s
cohort in China to the Open-Door Policy. It contributes to the literature on international trade’s eﬀect on low-skill worker in the developing country and the broader
literature on tradeoﬀ between labor participation and human capital accumulation.
The ﬁndings in this paper also encourages investigation of further evidence from other
countries.
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Table 3.1.: Summary Statistics of Export Exposure per prefecture, in 1000 USD
Percentile Export Exposure

Statistics

10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
N

Mean
0.402
Std Dev
2.527
Minimum -1.467
Maximum 34.898
Median
0.123

-0.074
0.035
0.123
0.303
0.664
198
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Table 3.2.: Summary Statistics of Export Exposure per province, in 1000 USD
Quintiles

Provinces

Mean

SD

Min

Max

20%
40%
60%
80%
100%

Zhejiang, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet
-0.023 0.026 -0.065 0.001
Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Henan, Sichuan 0.015 0.006 0.005 0.022
Hebei, Jiangsu, Hubei, Guangdong, Shaanxi, Qinghai
0.039 0.0131 0.023 0.053
Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Gansu, Ningxia
0.140 0.068 0.073 0.255
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Liaoning, Xinjiang
0.395 0.083 0.258 0.465
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Table 3.3.: Descriptive Statistics
1960
1990 Census
Education
Complete primary school
Complete middle school
Complete high school
Some high school
Some College

1970

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

0.847
0.631
0.281
0.289
0.024

0.36
0.483
0.449
0.454
0.154

0.863
0.524
0.096
0.142
0.028

0.344
0.499
0.294
0.349
0.164

Demographic Characteristics
Female
0.486
Ethnic Minority
0.078
Agriculture
0.574

0.5
0.268
0.494

0.489
0.08
0.627

0.5
0.272
0.484

N

142270

Source: IPUMS 1990 China Population Census.

277357
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Table 3.4.: High School Completion
(3)
3
0.0595*
(0.0299)

(4)
4
0.0710**
(0.0257)

(5)
5
0.0458**
(0.0130)

1961.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0217*
(0.0119)

0.00183
(0.00893)

-0.000448
(0.00844)

1962.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0107
(0.00855)

-0.00274
(0.00680)

-0.00595
(0.00698)

1963.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0103
(0.00886)

0.00302
(0.00916)

-0.0000967
(0.00890)

1964.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.00222
(0.0123)

-0.0176
(0.0123)

-0.0203
(0.0127)

1965.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.0212
(0.0185)

-0.0332**
(0.0143)

-0.0362**
(0.0139)

1966.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.0265
(0.0223)

-0.0392**
(0.0145)

-0.0423**
(0.0144)

1967.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.0305
(0.0252)

-0.0389*
(0.0192)

-0.0411**
(0.0179)

1968.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.0194
(0.0267)

-0.0365**
(0.0176)

-0.0399**
(0.0171)

1969.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.0265
(0.0262)

-0.0385*
(0.0198)

-0.0400**
(0.0187)

1970.birthyr×ΔXP W
Y
Y

-0.0407
(0.0293)
Y
Y

-0.0449**
(0.0181)
Y
Y
Y

2450185

2450185

2450185

-0.0476**
(0.0177)
Y
Y
Y
Y
2450185

ΔXP W

Province FE
Birth FE
Province × Birth FE
Prefecture Controls
N

(1)
1
0.104**
(0.0363)

2450185

(2)
2
0.0476**
(0.0175)

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001
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Table 3.5.: Middle School Completion
(3)
3
0.0578
(0.0345)

(4)
4
0.0588
(0.0350)

1961.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.00984
(0.00652)

0.0125
0.00328
(0.00744) (0.00497)

1962.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.00228
(0.00885)

0.0132
0.00382
(0.00817) (0.00647)

1963.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.000103 0.0225**
0.0135*
(0.00988) (0.00986) (0.00767)

1964.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0107
(0.0105)

0.0211**
0.0113
(0.00965) (0.00901)

1965.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0186
(0.0124)

0.0230**
(0.0112)

0.0129
(0.00901)

1966.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0279**
(0.0130)

0.0245**
(0.0115)

0.0127
(0.00880)

1967.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0321**
(0.0148)

0.0209
(0.0136)

0.0110
(0.0108)

1968.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0463**
(0.0170)

0.0280*
(0.0147)

0.0145
(0.0120)

1969.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0450**
(0.0180)

0.0261*
(0.0139)

0.0161
(0.0113)

1970.birthyr×ΔXP W
Y
Y

0.0545**
(0.0184)
Y
Y

0.0380**
(0.0142)
Y
Y
Y

2450185

2450185

2450185

0.0263**
(0.0123)
Y
Y
Y
Y
2406219

ΔXP W

Province FE
Birth FE
Province × Birth FE
Prefecture Controls
N

(1)
(2)
1
2
0.173*** 0.0803**
(0.0418) (0.0339)

2450185

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province levvel.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

(5)
5
0.0156
(0.0166)
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Table 3.6.: Trade Eﬀects on Non-Farmers
(1)
Middle School Completion
-0.0109
(0.0165)

(2)
High School Completion
0.0171
(0.0166)

1961.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.00905
(0.00560)

-0.0118
(0.00825)

1962.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.00518
(0.00810)

-0.00359
(0.0103)

1963.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.00160
(0.00725)

0.000129
(0.0101)

1964.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.00787
(0.00862)

-0.0193
(0.0144)

1965.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.00351
(0.00960)

-0.0302**
(0.0133)

1966.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.00646
(0.0110)

-0.0324**
(0.0149)

1967.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.0122
(0.0122)

-0.0331
(0.0203)

1968.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.0109
(0.0122)

-0.0215
(0.0191)

1969.birthyr×ΔXP W

-0.0167
(0.0126)

-0.0214
(0.0218)

1970.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.00834
(0.0141)
2286998

-0.0157
(0.0197)
2286998

ΔXP W

N

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 3.1.: School Completion Rates across Cohorts
Notes: Data is from China’s 2000 Census.
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Figure 3.2.: Highest Export Value Industries, 1960-1990
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Figure 3.3.: Export Exposure Mean Eﬀects on High School Completion
Notes: The y-axis shows the estimates of the decreases in high school completion rates in
response to a $402 (mean) increase in export exposure.
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Figure 3.4.: Percentile Eﬀects on High School Completion
Notes: The y-axis shows the estimates of the decreases in high school completion rates in
response to a certain level of increase in export exposure. From the top to the bottom, the
export exposure are at the 25th percentile, the 50th percentile and the 90th percentile.
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Figure 3.5.: Export Exposure Mean Eﬀects on Middle School Completion (NonFarmers)
Notes: The y-axis shows the estimates of the decreases in middle school completion rates
of non-farmers in response to a $402 (mean) increase in export exposure.
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Figure 3.6.: Percentile Eﬀects on Middle School Completion (Non-Farmers)
Notes: The y-axis shows the estimates of the decreases in middle school completion rates
of non-farmers in response to a certain level of increase in export exposure. From the top
curve to the bottom, the export exposure are at the 25th percentile, the 50th percentile and
the 90th percentile.
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Figure 3.7.: Export Exposure Mean Eﬀects on High School Completion (NonFarmers)
Notes: The y-axis shows the estimates of the decreases in high school completion rates of
non-farmers in response to a $402 (mean) increase in export exposure.
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Figure 3.8.: Percentile Eﬀects on High School Completion (Non-Farmers)
Notes: The y-axis shows the estimates of the decreases in high school completion rates of
non-farmers in response to a certain level of increase in export exposure. From the top
curve to the bottom, the export exposure are at the 25th percentile, the 50th percentile and
the 90th percentile.
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Figure 3.9.: Export Exposure Eﬀects on High School Completion, 1940-1970
Notes: The y-axis shows the estimates of the changes in high school completion rates of
non-farmers born 1940-1970 in response to a $402 (mean) increase in export exposure.
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A: Alternative Setting for The Factors 1
An alternative restriction to the factor loadings is non-triangular, as follows.
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(A.1)

where the ﬁrst factor is identiﬁed only from the covariances of ACTEnglish , COM 114,
and ACTReading . The second factor is identiﬁed from the covariances of ACTScience ,
HSGP A and ACTM ath . Therefore, an increase in the ﬁrst factor will only aﬀect
the ﬁrst three scores and an increase in the second factor will only aﬀect the other
three scores. Intuitively, I name the ﬁrst factor as verbal ability and the second as
math ability. Compared to the main speciﬁcation of the factors in Section 1.4.1, the
alternative sacriﬁces part of the covariances of the test scores by assuming the ﬁrst
factor does not aﬀect the second set of test scores at all. It might, however, makes
it easier to interpret the factors and more importantly, show more variation on the
second factor.
Table A.1 and A.2 shows the estimates of this alternative measurement system.
Coeﬃcients of controls are not much diﬀerent from the main speciﬁcation. The loadings of verbal skill on the ﬁrst set of test scores are signiﬁcantly positive, indicating
that an increase in verbal skill will signiﬁcantly increase ACTEnglish , COM 114 and
ACTReading , as expected. Similarly, an increase in math skill will signiﬁcantly increase ACTScience , HSGP A and ACTM ath . Speciﬁcally, for example, one standard
deviation1 increase in an average woman’s verbal skill will increase her ACTEnglish
by 3.92 points. One standard deviation increase in an average woman’s math skill
1

Standard deviation of female’s verbal skill is 3.448, female’s math skill is 3.770, male’s verbal skill
is 3.572, male’s math skill is 3.937.
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will increase her ACTM ath by 3.77 points. Compared to the main speciﬁcation of the
factors, the loadings of the new second factor have bigger magnitudes due to more
variations it takes from the test scores.
Figure A.1 and A.2 show the alternative ability distributions. Compared to Figure
1.1 and 1.2, it is obvious that distributions of the second factor (blue curves) in both
gender’s are more oﬀ from normality. Speciﬁcally, female’s second factor is bimodal
with a hump on the left tail and male’s second factor is left-skewed.
I then estimate the same model to analyze the sorting eﬀects in major choice
and job choice. Table A.3 show the estimates in major choice given the alternative
factors. Individuals sort positively on both abilities. Speciﬁcally, one standard deviation increase in an average woman’s verbal ability will increase her likelihood of
graduating in STEM by 5.23% percentage points; and that number for an average
man is 6.42%. One standard deviation increase in an average woman’s math ability
will increase her likelihood of graduating in STEM by 15.83% percentage points; and
that number for an average man is 25.98%. Both genders sort more on math ability
than on verbal ability. This is not surprising: the second factor now takes all common
variations form ACTScience , HSGP A and ACTM ath , not the “left-over” variations of
these scores after the ﬁrst factor has been identiﬁed. Additionally, it is intuitive that
math ability is more essential to STEM majors than verbal. Similar to the estimates
in the main speciﬁcation, we see here men sort more on both abilities as well. Men’s
coeﬃcients are statistically larger than women’s. In job choice (Table A.4), no sorting
on verbal ability for both gender. Although there is positive sorting on math ability,
however, the gender diﬀerence is zero. Overall, the estimates from the two speciﬁcations are telling a consistent story: men sort more on both latent abilities in major
choice; there is no gender diﬀerence in sorting on abilities in job choice.

14.669***
(3.054)
1,145

ACT E
-0.754
(0.749)
0.981
(0.752)
-1.273
(1.218)
2.323**
(1.129)
0.117***
(0.039)
1.862*
(1.052)
-1.521
(1.607)
1.138***
(0.049)

2.770***
(0.418)

COM114
-0.103
0.092
-0.128*
(0.097)
-0.194*
(0.146)
-0.049
(0.119)
0.012**
(0.005)
-0.034
(0.170)
0.037
(0.254)
0.042***
(0.005)

16.279***
(3.425)

ACT R
-0.911
(0.804)
0.107
(0.824)
-0.793
(1.298)
1.659
(1.149)
0.097**
(0.043)
2.574*
(1.275)
0.752
(1.915)
1
X

HSGPA
0.270
(1.995)
-4.285**
(2.129)
-3.334
(3.071)
0.472
(2.594)
0.579***
(0.113)
8.516**
(4.201)
-2.37
(6.270)

0.697*** 1.811***
(0.027)
(0.095)
16.168*** -14.099
(2.957)
(9.701)

ACT S
-1.710***
(0.585)
-0.322
(0.628)
-1.453*
(0.883)
0.336
(0.773)
0.103***
(0.034)
1.526
(1.315)
-0.251
(1.966)

1
X
15.597 ***
(3.484)

ACT M
-1.519**
(0.653)
-0.044
(0.705)
-0.814
(0.949)
0.992
(0.883)
0.109**
(0.038)
2.423
(1.599)
-0.100
(2.398)

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: Each column is a separate regression speciﬁed in Equation 1.11. All columns have the same observations: 1145. The loading of Verbal Skill
is normalized to one in regression of ACTReading , so that Verbal Skill takes the metrics of ACTReading . The loading of Math Skill is normalized
to one in regression of ACTM ath , so that Math Skill takes the metrics of ACTM ath . I control for annual state-averaged freshmen graduation rate
(AFGR) on the year of each student graduated from high school, home census region ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrst enrollment semester ﬁx eﬀects.

Observations

Constant

Math Ability

General Intelligence

First Term Semester: Spring

First Term Semester: Fall

AFGR

Home Region: South

Home Region: Northeast

Home Region: Midwest

Dependent Var→
Home Region: Indiana

Table A.1.: Non-triangular Abilities at College Entrance, Female
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8.7869***
(2.5743)
1,910

ACT E
-1.788***
(0.692)
-0.590
(0.714)
-1.039
(1.019)
0.476
(0.757)
0.168***
(0.029)
4.837***
(1.076)
2.705***
(1.354)
1.180***
(0.049)

2.2636***
(0.379)

COM114
-0.066
(0.079)
-0.199**
(0.083)
-0.195*
(0.118)
-0.007
(0.091)
0.018***
(0.004)
-0.212
(0.180)
-0.236
(0.225)
0.043***
(0.004)

16.952***
( 2.8526)

ACT R
-1.707***
(0.698)
-0.799
(0.726)
-0.941
(1.035)
0.296
(.7799)
0.090**
(0.033)
3.515**
(1.276)
1.210
(1.601)
1
X
0.808***
(0.027)
13.233***
(2.437)

ACT S
-1.726***
(0.548)
-0.276
(0.571)
-0.335
(0.758)
0.244
(0.626)
0.115***
(0.029)
5.558***
(1.152)
4.589***
(1.417)

ACT M
-1.206***
(0.544)
-0.160
(0.563)
-0.406
(0.712)
0.776
(0.613)
0.131***
(0.027)
5.817***
(1.063)
4.744***
(1.289)

1.684***
1
(0.079)
X
-26.697*** 12.888***
(7.402)
(2.296)

HSGPA
0.335
(1.595)
-4.919**
(1.673)
-3.523
(2.300)
0.064
(1.844)
0.664***
(0.086)
13.106***
(3.545)
10.850**
(4.403)

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: Each column is a separate regression speciﬁed in Equation 1.11. All columns have the same observations: 1910. The loading of Verbal Skill
is normalized to one in regression of ACTReading , so that Verbal Ability takes the metrics of ACTReading . The loading of Math Skill is normalized
to one in regression of ACTM ath , so that Math Skill takes the metrics of ACTM ath . I control for annual state-averaged freshmen graduation rate
(AFGR) on the year of each student graduated from high school, home census region ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrst enrollment semester ﬁx eﬀects.

Observations

Constant

Math Ability

General Intelligence

First Term Semester: Spring

First Term Semester: Fall

AFGR

Home Region: South

Home Region: Northeast

Home Region: Midwest

Home Region: Indiana

Table A.2.: Non-triangular Abilities at College Entrance, Male
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Table A.3.: Likelihood of Graduating with A STEM Major (nontriangular)
(1)
Female

(2)
Male
Marginal Eﬀects at the Mean

Verbal Ability

0.015**
(0.0071)

0.018***
(0.0064)

Math Ability

0.042***
(0.0059)
1145

0.066***
(0.0052)
1910

N

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table is diﬀerent with Table 1.6 in terms of the loadings structure of two factors. Column
(1) and column (2) show the marginal eﬀect of probit at the means for the female and male sample,
respectively. All marginal eﬀects reﬂect to changes in probability of graduating in STEM with one
unit increase in the corresponding ability. The standard deviation of female’s and male’s verbal
ability is 3.488 and 3.572; the standard deviation of female’s and male’s math ability is 3.770 and
3.937. The dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is dummy of majoring in STEM. Number
of Purdue graduates in the same major, number of Purdue female graduates in the same major, ﬁrst
enrollment year, ﬁrst enrollment semester, degree year ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled but not shown in
this table for short.

Table A.4.: Likelihood of STEM Graduates Work in STEM Occupations (nontriangular)
(1)
Female

(2)
Male
Marginal Eﬀects at the Mean

Verbal Ability

0.001
(0.0119)

0.004
(0.0062)

Math Ability

0.023**
(0.0108)
1145

0.013***
(0.0050)
1910

N

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table is diﬀerent with Table 1.7 in terms of the loadings structure of two factors. Column
(1) and column (2) show the marginal eﬀect of probit at the means for the female and male sample,
respectively. All marginal eﬀects reﬂect to changes in probability of working in STEM with one unit
increase in the corresponding ability of STEM graduates. The standard deviation of female’s and
male’s verbal ability is 3.488 and 3.572; the standard deviation of female’s and male’s math ability is
3.770 and 3.937. The dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is dummy of working in STEM.
Number of Purdue graduates in the same major, number of Purdue female graduates in the same
major, home state STEM demand, degree year ﬁxed eﬀects, home region ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled
but not shown in this table for short.
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Figure A.1.: Distributions of Female’s Two Abilities (nontriangular)
Distributions are centered at mean zero. sd(f 1) = 3.488; sd(f 2) = 3.770
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Figure A.2.: Distributions of Male’s Two Abilities (nontriangular)
Distributions are centered at mean zero. sd(f 1) = 3.572; sd(f 2) = 3.937
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B: Additional Tables and Figures for Chapter 1

Table B.1.: Selection: Self-report First Job Information
(1)
Female

(2)
Male

General Intelligence

0.0070428
(0.0083508)

-0.0057017
(0.0077115)

Extra Mathematical Ability

0.0007466
(0.0072008)
4565

0.0153035**
(0.006406)
5640

N

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: Column (1) and column (2) show the factor loadings but not the marginal eﬀects. The
dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is dummy of self-reporting ﬁrst job. Number of Purdue
graduates in the same major, number of Purdue female graduates in the same major, ﬁrst enrolled
year ﬁxed eﬀect, ﬁrst enrolled semester ﬁxed eﬀects, degree year ﬁxed eﬀects, degree semester ﬁxed
eﬀects, and home region ﬁx eﬀects are controlled but not shown in this table for short. The estimates
show that women who reported to the survey do not diﬀer on both abilities from women who did.
Although there is a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on men’s extra math ability, the magnitude is too
small to have signiﬁcant economic meaning. Using the loading to calculate the marginal eﬀect, I
get one standard deviation increase in extra math ability will increase the probability for an average
man to report his ﬁrst job information by 1.5 percentage points.
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Table B.2.: Likelihood of Graduating with A STEM Major
(1)
Female
# Purdue Graduates in Same Major
0.00812***
(0.000959)
# Purdue Female Graduates in Same Major -0.0322***
(0.00224)
First Enrollment Year = 2001
1.881
(1.429)
First Enrollment Year = 2002
1.764*
(0.933)
First Enrollment Year = 2003
1.192*
(0.706)
First Enrollment Year = 2004
1.064*
(0.612)
First Enrollment Year = 2005
0.711
(0.542)
First Enrollment Year = 2006
0.289
(0.473)
First Enrollment Year = 2007
0.535
(0.440)
First Enrollment Year = 2008
0.437
(0.362)
First Enrollment Year = 2009
0.185
(0.292)
First Enrollment Semester = Fall
4.899
(91.41)
First Enrollment Semester = Spring
4.293
(91.42)
Degree Year = 2007
0.241
(0.750)
Degree Year = 2008
0.464
(0.791)
Degree Year = 2009
0.954
(0.864)
Degree Year = 2010
0.810
(0.911)
Degree Year = 2011
1.554*
(0.936)
Degree Year = 2012
1.355
(0.963)
Degree Year = 2013
1.511
(0.977)
Degree Year = 2014
1.956*
(1.021)
Degree Semester = Fall
0.203
(0.373)
Degree Semester = Spring
-0.0614
(0.343)
General Intelligence
0.144***
(0.0175)
Mathematical Ability
0.102***
(0.0253)
Constant
-6.372
(91.42)
N
1145

(2)
Male
0.00838***
(0.000789)
-0.0366***
(0.00218)
1.227*
(0.739)
1.159
(0.717)
0.903*
(0.493)
0.869*
(0.446)
0.949**
(0.397)
0.632*
(0.355)
0.632**
(0.316)
0.609**
(0.284)
0.643**
(0.259)
1.369**
(0.651)
1.385*
(0.751)
-1.361**
(0.498)
-0.998**
(0.455)
-1.098**
(0.401)
-0.796**
(0.356)
-0.625**
(0.316)
-0.704**
(0.275)
-0.683**
(0.243)
0.2958
(0.9227457)
-0.161
(0.287)
-0.328
(0.270)
0.182***
(0.0155)
0.135***
(0.0173)
-0.408
(0.714)
1910

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: The sample includes undergraduate cohorts graduated from 2005–2014. Column (1) and
column (2) show the coeﬃcients and the loadings for the female and male sample, respectively. The
dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is a dummy of graduating in a STEM major. First
enrollment year = 2010, Degree Year = 2005 and Degree Year = 2006 are omitted due to collinearity.
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Table B.3.: Likelihood of STEM Major Graduates Working in A STEM Occupation
(1)
Female
# Purdue Graduates in The Same Major

0.00563***
(0.00118)
# Purdue Female Graduates in The Same Major
-0.0148***
(0.00404)
Home State STEM Demand
-0.000000573
(0.000000787)
Degree Year = 2005
-4.086
(3.79)
Degree Year = 2006
-3.795
(13.69)
Degree Year = 2007
0.424
(0.386)
Degree Year = 2008
0.290
(0.333)
Degree Year = 2009
-0.215
(0.303)
Degree Year = 2010
-0.0269
(0.340)
Degree Year = 2011
-0.314
(0.265)
Degree Year = 2012
-0.401*
(0.242)
Degree Year = 2013
-0.230
(0.236)
Home Region = Indiana
-0.652
(0.641)
Home Region = Midwest
-0.495
(0.574)
Home Region = Northeast
-1.116
(0.706)
Home Region = South
-0.700
(0.590)
General Intelligence
0.0492*
(0.0282)
Mathematical Ability
0.0490
(0.0410)
Constant
1.171
(0.718)
N
424

(2)
Male
0.00390***
(0.000758)
-0.0155***
(0.00416)
-0.000000500
(0.000000431)
0*
(.)
-1.644**
(0.673)
-0.158
(0.196)
0.0687
(0.191)
-0.0344
(0.193)
0.00299
(0.181)
-0.112
(0.171)
0.0933
(0.153)
0.0106
(0.142)
-0.214
(0.263)
-0.0814
(0.244)
-0.364
(0.329)
0.178
(0.279)
0.0366**
(0.0186)
0.0365*
(0.0221)
0.919**
(0.302)
1211

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: The sample includes undergraduate cohorts graduated from 2005–2014. Column (1) and
column (2) show the coeﬃcients and the loadings for the female and male sample, respectively.
The dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is a dummy of working in a STEM occupation.
Degree Year = 2014, and Home Region = West are omitted due to collinearity.
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Table B.4.: Salary of 11 Type (STEM Major, STEM Job)

State Annual Unemployment Rate
STEM Fraction of Total Employment
# STEM Total Employment
# non-STEM Total Employment
# Total Graduates
# Total STEM Graduates
# Female Graduates
# Female STEM Graduates
Job Region = New England
Job Region = Mid-Atlantic
Job Region = East North Central
Job Region = West North Central
Job Region = South Atlantic
Job Region = East South Central
Job Region = West South Central
Job Region = Mountain
Job Region = Paciﬁc
General Intelligence
Mathematical Ability
Constant
N

(1)
Female

(2)
Male

-136.0
(608.5)
-3004239.8
(2962201.5)
0.0176
(0.0242)
-0.000920
(0.00100)
1.091
(1.382)
0.477
(2.689)
-1.464
(3.218)
-1.766
(7.639)
7929.5**
(3272.5)
13217.5***
(3136.3)
6957.2***
(1465.9)
8486.6***
(2447.5)
9137.6***
(2113.0)
8825.2**
(3875.7)
13856.0***
(2195.1)
8118.4**
(2847.4)
14331.6***
(2502.0)
775.7***
(217.6)
-938.0**
(319.6)
16264.1
(227334.2)
310

-838.7**
(358.5)
-181322.5
(1713905.1)
-0.0000960
(0.0140)
-0.0000357
(0.000582)
1.209*
(0.668)
-1.201
(1.296)
-2.126
(1.536)
2.517
(3.655)
6977.5**
(2449.5)
7353.3***
(1570.9)
6077.3***
(844.5)
4197.4**
(1707.9)
7310.8***
(1200.1)
5050.3**
(1697.4)
12931.2***
(1289.0)
3855.0*
(2139.1)
17012.6***
(1261.4)
424.6**
(129.1)
-714.4***
(160.4)
58553.7
(115951.0)
983

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Column (1) and column (2) show the coeﬃcients and the loadings for the female and male
sample, respectively. The dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is self-reported annual
salary. Job Region = Indiana is omitted due to collinearity.
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Table B.5.: Salary of 10 Type (STEM Major, non-STEM Job)

State Annual Unemployment Rate
STEM Fraction of Total Employment
# STEM Total Employment
# non-STEM Total Employment
# Total Graduates
# Total STEM Graduates
# Female Graduates
# Female STEM Graduates
Job Region = New England
Job Region = Mid-Atlantic
Job Region = East North Central
Job Region = West North Central
Job Region = South Atlantic
Job Region = East South Central
Job Region = West South Central
Job Region = Mountain
Job Region = Paciﬁc
General Intelligence
Mathematical Ability
Constant
N

(1)
Female

(2)
Male

245.0
(1579.2)
-2565034.6
(7425402.7)
0.0237
(0.0612)
-0.000836
(0.00254)
0.321
(1.904)
1.025
(2.614)
-0.466
(3.790)
-2.796
(6.468)
12727.1
(8286.8)
14399.8**
(4673.7)
15747.4***
(2576.2)
7791.1
(5275.8)
7551.8
(6036.8)
10576.4**
(5255.9)
8632.4
(6521.1)
11319.4
(12051.8)
6931.7
(5406.7)
301.1
(420.0)
-1518.6**
(606.1)
200091.5
(401613.8)
114

-1059.2
(883.1)
-2578088.3
(4294849.1)
0.0257
(0.0358)
-0.000970
(0.00148)
2.874
(1.756)
-3.618
(2.976)
-6.163
(3.866)
10.01
(8.101)
2751.4
(12191.4)
1883.4
(4474.4)
5746.9**
(2091.6)
3538.6
(3523.7)
13629.4***
(3423.8)
-980.4
(5541.4)
6063.9
(3884.3)
15231.7**
(4770.5)
14658.0***
(4276.6)
164.0
(343.3)
-1095.8**
(374.6)
453778.7
(312401.1)
228

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Column (1) and column (2) show the coeﬃcients and the loadings for the female and male
sample, respectively. The dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is self-reported annual
salary. Job Region = Indiana is omitted due to collinearity.
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Table B.6.: Salary of 00 Type (non-STEM Major, non-STEM Job)

State Annual Unemployment Rate
STEM Fraction of Total Employment
# STEM Total Employment
# non-STEM Total Employment
# Total Graduates
# Total STEM Graduates
# Female Graduates
# Female STEM Graduates
Job Region = New England
Job Region = Mid-Atlantic
Job Region = East North Central
Job Region = West North Central
Job Region = South Atlantic
Job Region = East South Central
Job Region = West South Central
Job Region = Mountain
Job Region = Paciﬁc
General Intelligence
Mathematical Ability
Constant
N

(1)
Female

(2)
Male

-998.7*
(586.9)
-2051633.9
(2227097.8)
0.0140
(0.0185)
-0.000669
(0.000764)
0.965
(0.737)
-0.749
(1.258)
-1.561
(1.565)
1.300
(3.300)
6053.4**
(2989.4)
6998.5**
(2425.6)
7027.8***
(986.2)
6465.0**
(2338.5)
4876.7**
(1656.4)
4275.7*
(2320.4)
4799.1*
(2510.7)
4597.0*
(2462.7)
7462.1**
(2459.5)
154.7
(158.1)
-888.6***
(216.0)
75672.5
(134046.8)
721

-31.02
(578.5)
-137548.0
(2321971.8)
0.00263
(0.0190)
-0.0000751
(0.000790)
-0.150
(1.022)
-0.879
(1.951)
-0.200
(2.316)
2.954
(5.391)
6089.6*
(3266.6)
7861.3**
(2978.0)
7453.3***
(1072.5)
9657.1***
(2243.7)
6405.3***
(1782.5)
6027.3**
(2843.8)
9642.3***
(2253.3)
3237.2
(2028.4)
7880.8***
(2175.9)
153.4
(175.7)
-302.8
(193.0)
152025.6
(168848.6)
699

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Column (1) and column (2) show the coeﬃcients and the loadings for the female and male
sample, respectively. The dependent variable in both column (1) and (2) is self-reported annual
salary. Job Region = Indiana is omitted due to collinearity.
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C: Parallel Trend Assumption Tests 1
I use a linear time trend test on the Han cohorts born between 1950-1959 to
conﬁrm that there is no pre-treatment trend in men’s education compared to women.

Eduisc = θ +

C
X

ψj Ij + τ W omenisc + ηt + δ1 t × W omenisc + ΛXisc + εisc

j=1

where t is a linear time trend. Other notations are the same as the ones in the
main regressions. The null hypothesis is that the coeﬃcient of interaction term of
women and linear time trend, δ1 , is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. See Panel
A in Table C.1 shows that δ1 is small in terms of magnitude and not statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerent than zero.
Similarly, I test that if the parallel trend assumption holds for the DD between
Han women and non-Han women. The estimates of δ2 shows in Panel B of Table C.1.
is no diﬀerent trend between pre-treatment Han women and non-Han women.
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Table C.1.: Pre-Trend Assumption Test
(1)
CFPS (1950-1957)

(2)
CFPS (1950-1958)

(3)
CFPS (1950-1959)

Panel A. Han Women VS. Han Men
t × W omen
N

-.0779048
( .0577179 )
4303

-.0488348
( .0499611 )
4650

-.0220141
( .0432983)
4900

Panel B. Han Women VS. non-Han Women
t × Han
N

.118145
(.1263541)
2283

.1092896
(.1000051 )
2470

.1641309
(.0936827 )
2619

Note: The sample in column (1) includes birth cohorts from 1950-1957, the sample in column (2)
includes birth cohorts from 1950-1958, and the sample in column (3) includes birth cohorts from
1950-1959. The dependent variable is years of schooling. Independent variables include women
dummy/Han dummy, interaction of women and time/interaction of Han and time, province ﬁxed
eﬀects, and birth year ﬁxed eﬀects. Other controls include rural dummy, interaction term of rural
and women dummy/interaction term of rural and Han dummy, number of siblings, dummy of father completing high school, dummy of mother completing high school, dummy of father being a
communist party member and dummy of mother being a communist party member.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province-cohort level.
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D: Additional Tables and Figures for Chapter 3

Table D.1.: Export Exposure Eﬀects on Farmers’ Education
(1)
High School Completion
-0.374***
(0.0192)

(2)
Middle School Completion
-0.335***
(0.0167)

Farmer×ΔXP W

-0.00159
(0.0279)

0.00184
(0.0290)

Farmer×1961.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.00310
(0.0110)

-0.0101
(0.0102)

Farmer×1962.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0130
(0.0110)

-0.0137
(0.0127)

Farmer×1963.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0102
(0.0168)

-0.0162
(0.0148)

Farmer×1964.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0234
(0.0158)

-0.00690
(0.0149)

Farmer×1965.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0160
(0.0144)

-0.00166
(0.0158)

Farmer×1966.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0193
(0.0160)

-0.00285
(0.0172)

Farmer×1967.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0237
(0.0168)

0.00205
(0.0238)

Farmer×1968.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0297
(0.0208)

-0.00828
(0.0267)

Farmer×1969.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0365*
(0.0186)

-0.0112
(0.0287)

Farmer×1970.birthyr×ΔXP W

0.0203
(0.0205)
2244692

-0.0174
(0.0306)
2244692

Farmer

N
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
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